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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
TOM STOPPARD: HUMANINZING CHAOS
by
Elaine C. Pritzker
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Michael P. Gillespie, Major Professor
The purpose of this study was to critically evaluate Tom Stoppard’s application of
chaos theory and quantum science in ROSENCRANTZ AND GUILDENSTERN ARE
DEAD, HAPGOOD and ARCADIA; and determine the extent to which Stoppard argues
for the importance of human action and choice.
Through critical analysis this study examined how Stoppard applies the quantum
aspects of: (1) indeterminacy to human epistemology in ROSENCRANTZ AND
GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD; (2) complementarity to human identity in HAPGOOD;
and (3) recursive symmetry to human history in ARCADIA. It also examined how
Stoppard excavates the complexities of human action, choice and identity through the
lens of chaos theory and quantum science.
These findings demonstrated that Tom Stoppard is not merely juxtaposing
quantum science and human interactions for the sake of drama; rather, by excavating the
complexities of human action, choice and identity through the lens of chaos theory and
quantum science, Stoppard demonstrates the fundamental connection between individuals
and the post-Newtonian universe.
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INTRODUCTION
I accept chaos. I’m not sure whether it accepts me.
Bob Dylan1

In October 1989, Tom Stoppard gave a lecture at the California Institute for
Technology entitled ‘Playing with Science.’ During this lecture, Stoppard argued that
although his knowledge2 of science was general, he grasped it well enough to apply it as
a metaphor (Nadel 457). It is in this spirit that the current thesis is proposed: Through his
application of chaos theory, Tom Stoppard argues for the importance of human choice
and action in the universe, and thereby foregrounds human will as a fundamental part of
the chaotic universe and not merely subject to its whim. Stoppard intuits a connection
between the characteristics of human identity and modern science. Uncertainty,
unpredictability, indeterminacy, complementarity and the ultimate fate of the universe are
of the utmost importance not only for chaoticians in a cosmic sense, but also for
individuals in their daily lives. The proverbial flap of a butterfly’s wing has as much
impact as person’s decision to take a cab and the ramifications of each are just as
unpredictable. Although both are seemingly inconsequential occurrences, chaos theory
and experience tells us that both have incalculable and unpredictable potential
1

(Anderson 98)

2

In Tom Stoppard: A Life, Nadel explains, “the principle source of Stoppard’s
understanding of chaos theory was James Gleick’s Chaos… Gleick provides a clear
exposition of chaos not only in terms of scientific advances but in terms of the
individuals who understood, often tangentially or accidentally how a science of chaos
might exist” (Nadel 431).
1

ramifications. While the clock-work universe took the responsibility of action from the
individual, chaos theory emphasizes the potential effect (and therefore inherent
responsibility) of human action.
It is the anxiety over the realization that there is no longer a predetermined course
that Stoppard dramatizes in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead.3 He does not do so
in order to suggest that their (or our) existence is meaningless or out of their control as
previous critics have argued.4 In Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Stoppard emphasizes the
importance of action, and the ultimate responsibility of the individual for his or her
action, even in a world that cannot be predicted. Foolishly relying on a predetermined
system leads to apathy and indolence, paralyzing any inclination towards autonomous
action. In Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Ros and Guil’s inaction leads to their own quiet
fate.
In Hapgood and Arcadia, Stoppard takes a more direct approach by infusing the
very structures of his plays with chaos theory and quantum science. Hapgood exhibits
qualities of complementarity and questions the nature of identity. Arcadia’s plot structure
depends on recursive symmetry, strange attractors and human action for its movement
and development. In both plays Stoppard foregrounds relationships and sex, exploring the
many ways in which our actions are informed by them. Stoppard is not merely
juxtaposing quantum science and human interactions for the sake of drama; rather by
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Because this thesis argues that the characters in Stoppard’s play are distinct from their
Shakespearian predecessors, I will refer to the characters from the former as Ros and Guil
and from the latter, as Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. In the interest of brevity, I will refer
to the play by the shortened title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern.
4

Like Paul Delaney, Douglas Colby and June Schlueter.
2

excavating the complexities of human action, choice and identity through the lens of
chaos theory and quantum science, Stoppard demonstrates the fundamental connection
between individuals and the post-Newtonian world.
A Brief History of Quantum Science and Chaos Theory
According to classical physics (developed primarily from Sir Isaac Newton’s
theories)5 the world functioned as a machine, deterministically propelled by cause and
effect. In Chaos Theory and James Joyce’s Everyman, Peter Mackey describes the
“nature-the-machine” model as a clock or an engine.6 Composed of parts governed by
laws, Nature becomes “wheels within wheels” (Stoppard, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern
60). 7 With this concept engrained in Western civilization, the notion that if it were
possible for humans to somehow discover the underlying causes, to “pick the lock of
Nature”, it would also be possible to chart all future events.8 Mackey exposes the
inevitable problem with this view of the world:

5

John Gribbin describes the power of these theories: “[l]argely on the strength of
Newton’s justified reputation as the greatest scientific genius, in the 18th century, his
ideas about light, as well as his laws of motion and theory of gravity were widely
regarded as gospel” (Gribbin 41). Gribbin further claims that Newton “established the
first scientific paradigm, or model, of reality. This showed that the Universe obeys
precise rules, or laws, and that events as different as the motion of the planets around the
Sun and the bending of a light beam can be explained by the application of these rules”
(Gribbin 46).
6

Gribbin depicts it as: “[t]he image handed down to us by the giants of 17th century
science… ‘clockwork Universe,’ obeying inexorable laws” (Gribbin 46).
7

In the interest of space, further citations from this source will be identified by the
abbreviation: RG.
8

An example of this is the famous boast by Pierre Simon de Laplace, one of the leading
mathematicians of the 18th century. He famously boasted that “given the initial
conditions and intelligence large enough to perform the calculations, he could predict the
3

It inspires us – if intuitively – to trust that we can break the code of nature… No
matter how daunting the challenge, our knowledge, our epistemology, can
accurately define the metaphysical nature – the real qualities – of the world itself.
From this concept arises universal determinism, which says everything is
predetermined… The determinism, however, leaves us in a depressing condition
if we want to believe in our own freedom (Mackey 3).
As Mackey posits, prediction is possible in the determined Newtonian world, therefore
free will and autonomous human choice and action become subject to the same
predictable system. This idea of determinism becomes so engendered in Western
civilization that even once scientific findings began to indicate that the binary of cause
and effect that constituted the mechanical world was insufficient, members of the
scientific community, Einstein included, were deeply skeptical.9
With the proposal of the second law of thermodynamics in 1853, William
Thompson shook the Newtonian world with the realization that in the universe the level
of disorder is constantly rising and the amount of potential energy is steadily diminishing.
Before the second law of thermodynamics the clock work Newtonian universe ticked

state of the universe at any future moment” (Hayles 7). As Ian Stewart explains, “[w]hat
we must realize, when considering statements such as Laplace’s is the atmosphere of
excitement that prevailed in the science of the time, as phenomenon after, phenomenon –
mechanics, heat, waves, sound, light magnetism, electricity – was brought under control
by the self same technique. It worked. The paradigm of classical determinism was born:
if the equations prescribe the evolution of the system uniquely, without any random
external input, then its behavior is uniquely specified for all time” (Stewart 14).
9

As Gribbin states, Einstein’s two theories of relativity are considered part of classical
physics. This explains why “Einstein spent ten years of his life fighting a friendly running
battle in correspondence with Bohr, trying to show up the failings and absurdity of the
Copenhagen Interpretation” (Gribbin 19).
4

merrily on, never running down. The inevitability of disorder in isolated systems10 and
the continuous dissipation of energy in the universe11are two facets of the second law that
the nineteenth century world was most startled by. In Great Ideas in Physics, Alan
Lightman explains the trepidation many felt toward the second law,
Historically, the notion of a stable and unchanging universe has always been
appealing, and the second law upset many people, including scientists when it was
discovered in the mid-nineteenth century. The second law says that some
processes in nature are one-way arrows, never going backward, never returning
the world to its initial condition. The machines are running down. The universe,
on average, is dissipating itself (Great Ideas 61).
The ultimate fate of the universe became known as “heat death,” and the prospect
terrified the nineteenth century that had been raised with the stable, eternal Newtonian
world. The second law exposed a flaw in the Newtonian clockwork model forcing the
world to reexamine some of its most basic assumptions about nature.
Quantum theory sent shock waves through the Newtonian world, shattering the
clock work model and destabilizing notions of certainty and perception. In the early
twentieth century the world was ushered into an era of uncertainty and indeterminacy
both socially, politically, economically and scientifically. At the end of the nineteenth
10

Alan Lightman explains, “There are many equivalent statements of the second law of
thermodynamics: Isolated systems inevitably become less organized; the usable energy in
an isolated system is constantly decreasing…” (Great Ideas 63).
11

Lightman describes this phenomenon: “Heat can be converted to work only for so long,
and then the process must come to a halt. Since heat is continuously flowing from hot
bodies to cold bodies everywhere in the universe, as expressed by the second law of
thermodynamics, the universe is gradually losing its ability to do work. The total store of
usable energy is constantly diminishing” (Great Ideas 91).
5

century Max Planck, a leading German physicist, argued that light was not merely a wave
(as previously believed) but made up of “quanta” or discrete packets of energy. Through
his work with black body radiation, he realized that because quanta can be absorbed and
released, they can also change form. Albert Einstein would extend Planck’s discovery in
1905 with his own theory that light does not always behave like a wave – sometimes light
behaves as a particle. This wave-particle duality forms the basis of quantum theory and is
still one of the greatest enigmas of the quantum world. It was in response to the waveparticle duality that Niels Bohr developed his principle of complimentarity. The principle
of complementarity states that it is possible for matter to simultaneously exist in opposite
states (light, for example, consists of both particles and waves). It also states that the
observer, through the act of observation, ultimately effects which state will present itself.
The mysteries presented by the wave-particle duality launched an inquiry that would
change the face of classical physics forever.
The dual nature of light, along with the emphasis on the impact of the observer,
led physicists at the beginning of the twentieth century to attempt to describe this
seemingly paradoxical discovery; their work formed the basis of quantum theory. In the
1920s Werner Heisenberg, an assistant to Niels Bohr in Copenhagen, developed a
mathematical theory to account for the wave-particle duality. Around the same time
Erwin Schrödinger also developed a theory to describe the wave-particle phenomena.
Both theories made identical predictions, and together they formed the theoretical basis
of quantum mechanics. Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle (also known as
Indeterminacy) emphasized not only the role of the observer in an experiment, but also
the limits on our knowledge and powers of prediction. Rich explains: “Either the wave

6

amplitudes can be known or the probability of the electron’s position can be assessed, but
neither the position and velocity nor the amplitude can be known at the same time” (Rich
26). It is impossible to simultaneously measure the position and momentum of a quantum
object. This creates an immediate problem because in order to predict the future
trajectory of an object both the position and momentum are needed. Because of our
inability to measure both of these things, our knowledge of future trajectories will always
be uncertain. Uncertainty or indeterminacy becomes a common fixture in the quantum
world. The role of the observer allows for a certain amount of prediction; however the act
of observing places limits on how much the observer can know – the observer will
always be faced with uncertainty.
The phenomenon of the wave-particle duality of light and the role of the observer
is most often explained with the example of the double-slit experiment. In a double-slit
experiment, light is shown through a screen that has two slits. In one experiment, the
observer uses a photon detector to determine which hole the photons traveled through. In
the second experiment, the observer removes the photon detector. Our intuition tells us
that the results should be the same, whether being observed or not light should pass
through the screen the same way every time, but the results suggest otherwise. Alan
Lightman describes the role of the observer in a double-slit experiment:
When we don’t check the slit each photon goes through, each photon behaves as
if it went through both slits at the same time, as a spread-out wave would do.
When we do check, each photon goes through either one slit or the other and
behaves as a particle. Light behaves sometimes as a wave and sometimes as a
particle. Astoundingly, and against all common sense, the behavior that occurs in

7

a given experiment depends on what the experimenter chooses to measure.
Evidently the observer, and the knowledge sought by the observer, play some
kind of fundamental role in the properties of the thing observed. The observer is
somehow part of the system (Great Ideas 200).
The double-slit experiment highlights the two main consequences of wave-particle
duality: that observation determines the reality (properties) of matter and that
indeterminism is inherent in science. Scientists have an essential inability to precisely
predict the future events of a system in part due to the nature of their role as an observer
and their inability to disentangle from the object they are observing.
Although Einstein contributed to quantum theory, he resisted the implications of
Bohr’s and especially Heisenberg’s theories. Einstein was not alone in his skepticism,
many physicists at the time (and even today) struggled with the implications of quantum
theory and our inability to definitively articulate or even know the basic phenomena of
the world. Alan Lightman explains, “Many contemporary physicists have essentially
given up trying to describe the fundamental elements of nature by anything based on
common sense. Richard Feynman has remarked that he can picture invisible angles but
not light waves” (Alan Lightman, A Sense of the Mysterious 34). It was in fact the
indeterminacy inherent in quantum theory that Einstein persistently objected to. He
believed that everything should be deterministic and calculable; if it was not then that
was an indication that something was missing in the prediction, nothing else. Einstein
famously wrote back and forth with fellow physicists (such as Bohr and Born) debating
the strengths and weaknesses of the new theory they had helped to create. In a letter to
Born, Einstein summed up his feelings towards the quantum question: “The idea that an

8

electron exposed to a ray by its own free decision chooses the moment and direction in
which it wants to eject is intolerable to me. If that is so, I’d rather be a cobbler or a clerk
in a gambling casino than a physicist” (Mysterious 60). Until his death, Einstein refused
to accept the uncertain quantum world and instead worked tirelessly on his own “unified
field theory” – a theory which sought to unify the general theory of relativity and
electromagnetism. With this theory Einstein hoped to expose the errors of quantum
theory and to return the world to its Newtonian days when nature was predictable.
Einstein believed in the determinist world and refused to accept that some things cannot
be known.
Quantum physics revealed the indeterminacy inherent in the clockwork model and
destroyed the pre-quantum notion of a passive observer. From this place of uncertain and
indeterminate knowledge, physicists today still try to understand the most basic enigmas
of quantum theory. In the twentieth century, uncertainty is not unique to physics
however. With the social, political and moral upheavals of the twentieth century,
uncertainty has crept into almost every facet of our world. Increasingly, scholars have
employed cross-disciplinary tactics to examine issues in their own field. Within the past
twenty years, a particular relationship has arisen between quantum theory and literature
(most often post-modernism). Quantum theory’s emphasis on the power of the observer,
the complimentarity of identity, the indeterminacy of knowledge, and our ultimate
uncertainty in the face of the future has been appealing to a number of literary scholars.
In his book A Sense of the Mysterious, physicist and novelist Alan Lightman argues for
the fundamental connection between art and science:

9

The ambiguities and complexities of the human mind are what give fiction and
perhaps all art its power…Science is powerful, but it has limitations. Just as the
world needs both certainty and uncertainty, the world needs questions with
answers and questions without answers” (Lightman, A Sense of the Mysterious 9,
14).
Lightman notes the common use of metaphors and analogies in both disciplines as a
means of negotiating and articulating uncertainty. Katherine Hayles also explores the
relationship between science and literature, in her book Complex Dynamics in Literature
and Science she focuses specifically on the relationship between literature and chaos
theory.
Although chaos has traditionally been viewed in science and literature as merely
‘noise’ devoid of order or information, chaos theory (also known as the science of chaos)
is based on the discovery that highly chaotic systems are actually rich in information and
often exhibit some sort of underlying, though unpredictable, order. Hayles explains, “One
of the new science’s remarkable discoveries is that complex patterns emerge when they
are mapped into time-series diagrams” (Hayles 8). Chaotic or complex systems depend
on strange attractors and recursive symmetry to make sense of the information. Any point
in a system that attracts that system to it is an attractor; strange attractor occurs in a
nonlinear system. Using Stephen Smales baker’s transformation metaphor Hayles
explains,
Imagine that the complex layering of dough in a croissant were infinitely thin.
Points which started out very close to one another, as the folding and stretching
continue, diverge unpredictably. Yet they continue to evolve within a confined

10

region. This conveys the flavor (so to speak) of how a strange attractor behaves
when mapped into phase space. Its strangeness is now apparent, for it combines
pattern with unpredictability, confinement with orbits that never repeat
themselves (Hayles 9).
Not only were these strange attractors creating order in seemingly disordered systems,
but once scientists began looking for them they seemed to be everywhere. From the
weather to measles epidemics to cotton prices to dripping faucets – investigators
discovered that systems previously perceived to be hopelessly disordered exhibited
strange attractors which in turn, indicated the underlying order of the system. Hayles
notes, “The pervasiveness of strange attractors was both exhilarating and puzzling –
exhilarating because it suggested that the idea had a wide scope; puzzling because it
implied that systems which seemed completely different from one another nevertheless
had something in common” (Hayles 10). But strange attractors only dealt with specific
points in a system and did not seem to indicate how these patterns were emerging. While
strange attractors are concerned with certain points in a system, recursive symmetry
focuses on the general form of a system and the way it is repeated across different length
scales. Hayles illustrates the significance of recursive symmetry:
The importance of recursive symmetry to complex systems derives from the kind
of perspective required to see the predictability that lies hidden within their
unpredictable evolutions. Mitchell Feigenbaum was the first to realize that,
although iterating a nonlinear function yielded unpredictable results, the rate at
which the recursions occurred quickly approached the limit that proved the
universal constant. This constant expresses an orderliness amidst the

11

unpredictability by showing that large-scale features relate to small-scale ones in
a predictable way (Hayles 10).
Recursive symmetry is crucial to understanding the extreme sensitivity of complex
dynamic systems to small fluctuations.
Chaos theory does not abolish order, on the contrary, chaos theory affirms the
necessity of order in our universe while realizing that disorder is also necessary and
between the two the universe generates itself. As Katherine Hayles argues in her book
Strange Attractors, “At the center of chaos theory is the discovery that hidden within the
unpredictability of chaotic systems are deep structures of order. ‘Chaos,’ in this usage,
denotes not true randomness but the orderly disorder characteristic of the system”
(Hayles 1). Chaos theory defies Western assumptions of chaos as merely order’s
opposite. Hayles argues that a pivotal moment in the science of chaos “occurred when
complex systems were conceptualized as systems rich in information rather than poor in
order” (Halyes 6). Chaos theory repeatedly demonstrated a more accurate depiction and
understanding of the world because it took into account the unpredictable as it unfolded
along with the predictable. As Hayles argues, “[p]art of the change that the science of
chaos has brought about is the recognition that nonlinear systems are all around us, in
every puff of wind and swirl of water” (Hayles 17). Stoppard too seems to intuit this and
in an endeavor to express the implications of chaos theory for human beings, he
dramatizes the inherent similarities between individuals and chaotic systems and in doing
so demonstrates the power of human action and choice.

12

Conclusion
As the science of chaos continues to more accurately explain and describe our
universe, the more it becomes a part of our lives. Widely considered a pop-oddity among
fringe sciences, chaos has gained steam and validity. So much so that chaos has become a
part of our everyday life. Pop culture is smattered with books, movies and television
shows that overtly or covertly use/depend on chaos theory or quantum science. Even on
an abstract level there is a greater acceptance of chaos and its implications. Academics in
the Humanities have since discovered the benefits of adopting the principles of chaos
theory for greater interpretive clarity. Though not always rigorously applied, literary
scholars have achieved impressive critical arguments (of both past and present texts) by
the metaphorical application of chaos theory. Though some remain skeptical of this new
relationship between the sciences and the humanities, many see it as natural as the
systems chaos theory describes. In fact, the very process of writing is infused with
aspects of chaos and the importance of embracing this chaos is becoming increasingly
relevant. American universities’ pedagogical practices for writing are increasingly geared
towards a process based writing practice that embraces the inherent chaos in the process.
In his book Engaging Ideas, John Bean rejects the outdated ‘traditional’ view of writing
as “formulaic” (the student plugs in facts plus a thesis and yields a paper); rather Bean
argues that writing is a process infused with uncertainty and chaos, and rarely develops in
an ordered and structured manner. Citing the French word for ‘rough draft’ brouillon
(which literally means ‘to place in disorder, to scramble’, is etymologically related to
words for cauldron and vortex) Bean argues: “This metaphor suggests a writing process
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that begins as a journey into disorder, a making of chaos out of which one eventually
forges an essay” (Bean 16). Order arises out of disorder.
As chaos becomes more and more prevalent in our lives, it is important to
understand our own role in a universe driven by chaos. Stoppard puts forward his opinion
in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Hapgood and Arcadia. Stoppard argues for the
importance of human action and choice, and the complexities of the individual lives that
influence them. Although the complexities of every individual are compounded in a
chaotic universe they are at least given the hope of influence. Though the results of their
actions are unpredictable, they have the freedom to make choices and take action. This
freedom is what saves us from being helpless victims of a chaotic universe. We are
autonomous agents that create as much chaos as order. As Stoppard demonstrates, the
most unpredictable entity in the universe is the individual.

14

CHAPTER I: SURVEY OF CRITICISM
I am satisfied with the mystery of life’s eternity and with the awareness of – and glimpse
into the marvelous construction of the existing world together with the steadfast
determination to comprehend a portion, be it ever so tiny, of the reason that manifests
itself in nature. This is the basis of cosmic religiosity, and it appears to me that the most
important function of art and science is to awaken this feeling among the receptive and
keep it alive.
Albert Einstein
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead
When Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead was first performed, the National
Theatre was taking a gamble not only on a young unknown playwright, but also on an
inexperienced cast and director. No one could have anticipated that this rag-tag play
would be hailed as “the most important event in the British professional theatre of the last
nine years” (Fleming 47). The initial critical response highlighted and emphasized the
play’s absurdist or postmodern aspects, which in light of the period in which it was
written, seems appropriate. Stoppard however, has flatly denied consciously infusing the
play with the existential angst that marks many postmodern texts. He says that his “chief
interest and objective was to exploit a situation which seemed to me to have enormous
dramatic and comic potential – of these two guys who in Shakespeare’s context don’t
really know what they are doing” (qtd. in Fleming 48). Stoppard does allow for an
existentialist or absurdist reading while stipulating that, “[i]t has the right combination of
specificity and vague generality which was interesting at that time. That’s why, when the
play appeared, it got subjected to so many different kinds of interpretation, all of them
plausible, but none of them calculated” (qtd. in Fleming 49). This “generosity” of
Stoppard to open his text to any number of critical interpretations has only fueled the
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debate around the maddening questions of just what exactly Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern is positing about mortality, fate, and the very nature of truth and identity.
It would be remiss to put forth an interpretation of the nature of Ros and Guil’s
identity without acknowledging the long, deterministic history of critical responses to this
very subject. Many critics point first to the three plays to which Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern owes a conceptual debt. The first is Shakespeare’s Hamlet to which
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern owes not only its plot structure but, as some argue, its
sense of the meta-fictional. Like Pirandello’s Six Characters in Search of an Author,
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern deals with the relativity of truth and the multiplicity of
human personality within the structure of the play-within-the-play. Alongside Beckett’s
Waiting for Godot, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern seems to draw many parallels not only
between the comic business that takes place in both, but also chance seemingly direct
parallels between the characters (Estragon and Rosencrantz; Vladimir and Guildenstern).
Critics have also argued however that despite these connections to established literary
canon, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern lacks a certain aspect which fails to make it literary
and confines it to the theatrical. Felicia Londré goes so far as to argue that Rosencrantz
and Guildenstern simply does not hold up as literature and should be appreciated as it
was intended, on the stage.
Critics unable to reconcile themselves with the literary inconsistencies in
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern point to the intellectual aspect of the play as being both its
virtue and its vice. Normand Berlin makes the argument that Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern only functions on the intellectual level, making it a critical exercise for
Stoppard and the audience, but in the same stroke undermining the tragedy. Richard
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Allen Cave on the other hand does not find the “parody” destructive (in the sense that it is
“elevated to the status of high comedy”), but he does fault the lack of imagination that
Ros and Guil must possess as an “ethical failing” of the play. David Cowart asserts that
this idea of illusion that Stoppard toys with throughout Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, is
not merely his method but his subject. However for Cowart the relationship that develops
between Hamlet and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern becomes “inimical to tragedy” and as
Berlin argued, ultimately eradicates tragedy as it was “classically conceived.”
The relationship between Hamlet and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern has focused
much of criticism on the meta-fictional aspects of the play, particularly the way in which
Ros and Guil function as characters. On the basis of the meta-fictional nature of the text
many critics have drawn metaphysical conclusions. Douglas Colby makes two bold
arguments in regards to the play’s metaphysical implications. He argues first that because
they are characters they have no will power and are therefore spiritually dead. His second
argument is that the meta-fictional nature of the play suggests that the audiences are not
only characters in a larger cosmic drama but are also spiritually dead. June Schlueter does
not argue for the spiritual death of the characters and the audience, but she does agree
that Ros and Guil are characters and therefore are only obligated to perform. Indeed
Schlueter later argues in “Postmortem” that Stoppard creates the “illusion of freedom”
but ultimately Ros and Guil are bound to the “tyrannical power of the script.”
The seemingly mystical way in which Ros and Guil are propelled through
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern has sparked a great debate around the idea and function of
“design” in the play. In a world with wheels within wheels, Ros and Guil are caught with
no apparent agency in or understanding of the world through which they are moving.
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Through the metaphor of a game, Jenkins argues that the world only appears absurd when
viewed through the limited perspective of Ros and Guil, but when viewed through the
elevated structure of Hamlet, the design becomes clear. The fact that Ros and Guil never
get to see the larger design behind their lives does not indicate to Paul Delaney that their
struggle was meaningless. Instead it demonstrates to him that their constant search for
coherence implies a firm belief that there is some greater design to comprehend (as the
audience already knows because of Hamlet). John Fleming refutes Delaney’s strict
application of “design at work.” Fleming finds this line of criticism reductive in that the
play’s message becomes human life helplessly dragged toward the unknowable
inevitability which has been preordained. He argues instead that Ros and Guil’s very
human struggle for comprehension redeems them from their “characterness” and that it
conveys the play’s true message: that every human life matters, no matter how small.
In “The Game of Coin Tossing” Douglas Colby centers in on the opening scene of
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern (and the idea it conveys of there being two sides to every
coin) as emblematic of the four themes he sees running through the play: all of which
emphasize Ros and Guil’s purported lack of autonomy and identity. With the first theme
(there are two sides to every story), Colby argues that not only is Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern the “reverse side” of Hamlet but that it is in fact complementary “the
missing half that completes the Elizabethan tale” (Colby 30). Although he defines the
second theme as “Ros and Guil are essentially two sides of the same person,” Colby
hastens to point out that they are similar yet distinct (like the two sides of the coin Guil is
“heads” or “the brains” and Ros is “tails” or “the ass”). While the third theme (Fate)
leaves room for Ros and Guil’s deaths to be tragic, Colby concludes that because they are
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characters swept up in a predestined plot over which they have no control, they have no
will power and are therefore spiritually dead. Colby argues that the fourth theme (the
complementary sides of Ros and Guil) suggests that this double identity extends to the
audience and that they too are not only characters in some larger cosmic drama but ipso
facto, they are spiritually dead.
However, Colby fails to acknowledge that Stoppard goes to great pains to draw
out two distinct characters. He does this right from the start by pointedly assigning Ros
and Guil character traits. Stoppard uses the coin tossing to create a distinction between
the two characters from the very start. Although both characters presumably have been
experiencing the same “phenomenon” of a coin repeatedly landing on heads, their
reactions are disparate. Ros’s response is complacent: “The run of “heads” is impossible,
yet Ros betrays no surprise at all – he feels none. However, he is nice enough to feel a
little embarrassed at taking so much money off his friend. Let that be his character note”
(my emphasis; RG 11). Ros genuinely sees nothing wrong with this – he tacitly assumes
that there is some reason this is happening.
Critics who argue for Ros and Guil’s capacity for choice have most often pointed
to the moment when Guil decides to reseal Hamlet’s death sentence, thereby sealing their
own fates. Felicia Londré highlights Ros and Guil’s existential decision at the end of the
play to follow through with their mission (to deliver Hamlet to England even though they
know that he will die) as the most important nuance Stoppard added. Although Londré
does not feel that this makes them tragic heroes (for her their deaths are meaningless
because they fail to acquire self-knowledge), she does point out that without the anxiety
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of the experience over that choice, they could not be the subjects of their own play – there
would be no drama.
The fact that Ros and Guil never truly understand their circumstance does not
indicate to Paul Delaney that everything that has transpired was meaningless. What is
important is that “they make continuous attempts to master the situation and comprehend
it with the assumption there is something to comprehend” (Delaney, Theatre of Chaos
34). Delaney methodically refutes the criticism that has relegated Tom Stoppard’s
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to the ranks of merely the existential or absurd.
Referencing a number of critics (mainly Gruder and Brassell), Delaney argues that, even
in the midst of their seemingly incomprehensible circumstance, Ros and Guil maintain
the belief that there is some greater design (whether they are capable of perceiving it or
not) and that they are “in an isolation amid a cosmic void” (Chaos 21). Delaney posits
that Stoppard is not attempting to pass a moral judgment on Ros and Guil, rather he is
trying to “dramatise their bewilderment before forces which they do not understand”
(Chaos 30). For Delaney it is through their attempts (actions) to understand that Ros and
Guil become the dramatic characters previous critics have denied them to be.
Chaos Theory and Literary Criticism
It becomes evident by even a relatively small sampling of critics that the
mechanical view of the world is still deeply imbedded in most of the critical approaches
to the play. Although Fleming’s argument that Ros and Guil are mindless pawns helpless
to an omniscient pre-destiny is reductive, it is undeniable that without this notion of a
“greater design” the play would ultimately read as absurdist. What becomes imperative in
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resisting the timeless seduction of determinism is to remember that chaos theory does not
eradicate determinism; in fact it is crucial to Chaos theory.
Chaos theory merely affirms that although a system may have determinate initial
causes – nothing is immune to chance or choice. The play balances the determinism of
Hamlet, which gives their search meaning, and the indeterminate events of Rosencrantz
and Guildenstern, which gives Ros and Guil the dramatic tension necessary to be full
characters. Without Guil’s constant faith that there is something to comprehend and that
they are somehow missing it, the two become helpless fools battered about by the literary
minds of Shakespeare and Stoppard. The prospect of a design gives them the prospect of
purpose, the prospect to do something. It is important to keep in mind however that
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern is a design, one which is constantly referencing itself. It is
this tension over their true identity and subsequently the choice they are presented with at
the end of the play that is necessary for their ability to be subjects of their own drama. It
is this existential turmoil which makes them the dramatic characters that they never could
have been in Hamlet.
Chaos theory offers the reader an avenue of escape from the soul-crushing
determinism that dominates the play’s criticism. Thomas Jackson Rice argues that chaos
theory, “springs from the discovery that chaos is ordered, that a vast array of complex
and purportedly random phenomena, studied in sufficient detail, reveal deeply embedded
patterns, designs that exist independently of the individual’s act of observation” (qtd. in
Rice 84). Although chaos theory has been studied and applied to literature from a number
of different vantage points, for this particular discussion Rice’s critique of philosopher
Karl Popper’s stance on Chaos theory and its implications about the individual and free
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will are central and sufficient. Popper reasons that the only way for human freedom to be
possible “in a universe that blends determinism and chance” is an assimilation of
consciousness and objective knowledge. Popper explains, “Our universe is partly causal,
partly probabilistic, and partly open: it is emergent” (qtd. in Rice 86). The limit on human
epistemology places the individual in a perilous balancing act between “phenomena that
are deterministic in retrospect and unpredictable in prospect” (Rice 86). Therefore,
Popper argues human reason is unlimited in regard to criticism but limited in its powers
of prediction. In any given moment an individual is limited in his or her ability to predict
what will happen but has an unlimited ability to critically engage his or her environment.
Popper’s argument demonstrates that both the lack of limitation and limitation are
essential for human rationality to exist.12 It is this facet of Chaos theory that this thesis
sees as being the root of Stoppard’s argument for the autonomy of the individual, and
uses to argue for the agency of Ros and Guil in Stoppard’s play.
Although Chaos theory may not satisfactorily answer all of the questions raised
by Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, it is inarguably an early attempt at dramatizing a
philosophy that Stoppard would expand in his later plays. Many critics have argued, in
fact, that Stoppard comes into his own with Chaos theory in Arcadia (1993). In this vein
John Bull posits:
Where Stoppard had played with philosophy in earlier plays, here [Arcadia] its
deployment is central to his establishment of what is, in effect, a political credo:
12

Popper contends that “human reason is unlimited with regard to criticism yet limited
with regard to its powers of prediction; and shows that both the lack of limitation and the
limitation are, in their respective places, necessary for human rationality to exist at all”
(qtd. in Rice 86).
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that the individual is more or at least capable of being more, than just a
construction of the political state; that all ideologies will crumble in the face of
individual will; but that the result is not an ungovernable chaos, rather a set of
unpredictable patterns (Bull 150).
Though directed at Arcadia, this “credo” can just as easily be applied to the problems
presented by Rosencrantz and Guildenstern that this thesis attempts to address. Ros and
Guil are certainly more than their “construction of the political state” – in this case
Hamlet.
In Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Stoppard drops two characters into a complex
system in which Hamlet represents a determinate reality from which an indeterminate
reality (along with Ros and Guil) emerges along its margins. Because Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern is indeterminate it is not necessarily bound to its urtext. As Chaos theory
affirms, even in a system that is initially deterministic, small differences can create vastly
divergent outcomes, thus predicting the future is nearly impossible. Though Chaos theory
and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern may seem hopelessly disparate subjects, there has
been a substantial amount of scholarly work dedicated to exposing the similarities
between this mathematical field and literary studies. As Peter Mackey posits in Chaos
Theory and James Joyce’s Everyman, “[i]n postmodernism, quantum indeterminacy, or
any other kind, finds epistemological, semiological, ontological and finally, metaphysical
expression” (Mackey 12). Although Chaos theory becomes an inadequate method of
analysis when fully applied to Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, this denigrates neither the
elements of Chaos theory that are present nor the impacts that these elements have.
Critics point to one of Stoppard’s later plays, most often Arcadia, when discussing the

23

relationship between his work and Chaos theory. However, it is arguable that
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern served as a drawing board for Stoppard to develop his
philosophy of Chaos theory and to experiment with the application of it in theater. This is
not intended to detract from the validity of the play or the characters. Quite the contrary,
John Bull posits that in Arcadia, “Stoppard’s use of “chaos theory” allows him to argue
for the supremacy of the individual in a way that would have gladdened the hearts of
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern” (Bull 147). Stoppard first endeavors to make this
argument (as previously stated by Bull) in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern and because of
that, Ros and Guil should be viewed as autonomous characters that maintain their
“supremacy of the individual” despite their imposing and deterministic environment.
Hapgood
When Hapgood was first published in 1988 it quickly gained the reputation of
being Stoppard’s most “scientific” play to date. Audiences were baffled by the intricacies
of Stoppard’s complex quantum laden plot. Although the play failed to gain much critical
or popular success, critics still point to it as Stoppard’s technical drawing board for his
highly acclaimed scientific masterpiece, Arcadia. However, the application of science in
theater is not the only conceptual debt Arcadia owes Hapgood. As Paul Edwards argues
in “Science in Hapgood and Arcadia:” “Science should, through the sideways slant of its
analogies, illuminate the human world, and perhaps show it in a more intense and
emotional light then could be achieved through more direct treatment” (Edwards 172). In
Hapgood, Tom Stoppard explores how science (quantum science in particular)
illuminates the human world. He explores the mystery that lies at the heart of quantum
mechanics by dramatizing the complexity and contingency of human identity. He reveals
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identity to be fluid and to some extent determined by the context in which a person is
viewed.
Like light, identity exhibits characteristics of indeterminacy and complementarity
and is contingent on the observer. Stoppard makes a clear juxtaposition between the
mystery of light and the mystery of identity, both of which require a ‘both/and’
perspective to appreciate. Stoppard argues for a ‘both/and’ perspective in a world in
which the ‘either/or’ paradigm is antithetical not only to the reality of the universe but
also to the reality of human identity - both of which can be said to have infinite and
contradictory possible manifestations that only become fixed when someone observes it
from a specific point of view.
Through the quantum metaphor of complementarity, Stoppard brings the abstract
concepts of the new sciences down to the most basic and relatable level: the complexity
and duality of every individual identity. In his article Particle Physics and Particular
Persons, Paul Delaney posits: “That impossible reality – that light consists of waves if
the experimenter looks for one phenomenon but of particles if he looks at it in a different
way – becomes in Hapgood a metaphor both for the mysteries of the world of espionage
and the even greater intricacies of the human personality” (Delaney 132). Delaney
highlights the connection Stoppard makes between the complementarity and
indeterminacy in particles and personalities. Through quantum mechanics, Stoppard
argues not only for a shift from an ‘either/or’ to a ‘both/and’ mindset, but for a reverence
for the mystery of identity and the universe.
Critics of Hapgood have often argued that Stoppard is timid in his application of
quantum theories and fails to use it to its full postmodern potential. In “Tom Stoppard
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and Postmodern Science,” Daniel Jernigan contends that “instead of embracing the
radical anti-epistemology of quantum mechanics that would link his work to the thought
of such figures as Nietzsche and Derrida… Stoppard can be seen to be offering a
thoroughly classical interpretation of quantum mechanics” (Jernigan 10). According to
Jernigan, Stoppard’s interpretation of quantum mechanics is more in line with Einstein
and Bohm. Stoppard “imagines that a classical scenario that normalizes nonclassical
behavior still persists. Stoppard thus avoids using quantum mechanics to its full
postmodern potential and even appears to side with Einstein in his desire for a more
explicable quantum world” (Jernigan 11). But Stoppard is not trying to make physics
classical again, rather, he attempts through dramatization to demonstrate how principles
of quantum mechanics (like doubling, complementarity and indeterminacy) are inherent
not just in the universe but in the individual as well.
Stoppard carefully constructs a plot which will not only allow him to explore the
intricacies of quantum science and identity, but will self-reflexively reinforce these
concepts. Katherine Kelly argues in Tom Stoppard and the Craft of Comedy, that
Stoppard’s construction of Hapgood illustrates both “how a scientific paper and a work
of art differ and how they overlap” (Kelly 155). Continuing with the metaphor of play as
experiment, Kelly posits that the first act contains a failed experiment that leads to a
hypothesis. The failed experiment is, of course, the mime in the first scene of the play in
which Hapgood, Wates, Ridley and Merryweather attempt to discover whether Kerner
has been leaking unauthorized information to the KGB. Through the botched mission,
Hapgood, Wates and Blair realize that the person who has been slipping information to
the Russians is Ridley.
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The failed experiment leads to the second act which, as Kelly describes it, carries
out the experiment developed by Blair and Hapgood to catch Ridley in the act. Stoppard
explains, “In a normal spy thriller you contrive to delude the reader until all is revealed in
the denouement; this is the exact opposite of a scientific paper in which the denouement –
the discovery – is announced at the beginning. Hapgood to some extent follows this latter
procedure. It is not a whodunit because we are told who has done it near the beginning of
the first act, so the story becomes how he did it” (qtd. in Fleming 180). Jenkins describes
the effect being that “with logical precision, Stoppard leads us through each layer of his
theme to its human centre, and the rest of Act One deploys the uncertainties of espionage,
quantum physics, and individual personality until they interlock at the conclusion of the
Act in the play’s crucial equation” (Jenkins 187). This first act also sets up a number of
motifs which Stoppard will continue to use throughout the play such as twinning and the
indeterminacy of identity. Edwards argues: “twinning and doubling are at the heart of the
analogy this play makes with quantum physics, by making the “uncertainty principle”
concrete on a human scale” (Edwards 173). As Edwards’s argument suggests, Stoppard
demonstrates how uncertainty is a fundamental part of human reality and identity.
In Hapgood, Stoppard rejects the reductive ‘either/or’ worldview and embraces a
‘both/and’ mindset in which the wonderful mysteries and complexities of quantum
science are one and the same with those of human identity. Kerner gets at the heart of
Stoppard’s message when discussing Einstein’s reluctance to accept the implications of
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty principle:
Quantum mechanics made everything finally random, things can go this way or
that way, the mathematics deny certainty, they reveal only probability and chance,
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and Einstein couldn’t believe in a God who threw dice. He should have come to
me, I would have told him, ‘Listen, Albert, He threw you – look around, He never
stops’ (Stoppard, Hapgood 49).
Through Kerner (as Delaney notes) Stoppard implies “that the wholly unpredictable
uniqueness of the particular individual constitutes evidence of the divine” (Delaney 129).
Stoppard argues not only for the autonomy of the individual but for the humble
amazement of the mystery that is identity. He will go on to perfect not only his treatment
of science but also his argument for the individual in his most successful play, Arcadia.
Arcadia
When Arcadia was first published and performed in 1993, it was praised not only
for its masterful use of chaos theory in both the structure and the content of the play, but
also for the depth of its feeling. Having been labeled as a cold and unfeeling writer since
the publication of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Stoppard finally dispelled such
criticisms with Arcadia. Previously deemed an absurdist, Stoppard began to be described
by critics like Paul Edwards as “a deeply Romantic writer in that the emotional heart of
his plays has to lie in what cannot be articulated directly” (Edwards 172). As an author
consistently accused of being “too cerebral” Stoppard had finally touched the hearts of
both critics and audiences. Although Edwards opens his article “Science in Hapgood and
Arcadia” with disparaging remarks towards Hapgood’s critical reception, he seems to
tacitly agree with what he presents as Stoppard’s view: that Hapgood’s “technical
successes were to be the foundation for the critical success of Arcadia” (Edwards 171).
What Stoppard achieves in Arcadia is not merely sentimentally powerful or scientifically
adroit; it is a melding of both modern science and universal humanism which
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demonstrates that we are not merely affected by the chaotic inclinations of nature; rather
we are a fundamental part of it.
Critics who have engaged Arcadia’s use of chaos theory have focused specifically
on three aspects: that chaos is not randomness or chance; the importance of fractals in a
chaotic system; and the unavoidable sensitive dependence on initial conditions. In his
article “Comedy, Chaos, and Casuistry,” Ronald H. McKinney describes chaos theory as
“concerned with examining the unstable behavior of non-linear, dynamic systems, those
‘in which extreme sensitivity to initial conditions create effects that are disproportionate
to their causes’” (McKinney 395). In Arcadia initial conditions (which may seem trivial
at first) have an unpredictable yet significant impact on later characters.
William Demastes argues that Thomasina’s “Geometry of Irregular Forms,” (now
known as fractal geometry) is “yet another significant path of entry into chaotic, a
butterfly-effect engagement of the study of morphology” (Chaos 92). Thomasina
observes “[m]ountains are not pyramids and trees are not cones” and it is the endeavor of
her new geometry to better represent nature. “Armed thus, God could only make a
cabinet” she exclaims. Rather than just accepting this, as Septimus does, Thomasina
declares “What a faint-heart! We must work outward from the middle of the maze.”
(Stoppard, Arcadia 37).
Using Stephen Kellert’s example of a jagged coastline, Demastes demonstrates
that although nature “does not create straight edges but rather fractals” what is important
is “the surprising self-similarity that nature utilizes throughout these scaled levels, selfsimilarity betraying duplication because of small though rising adjustments at each stage”
(Chaos 92-93). He argues, “[t]iny initial deviations result in natural diversity, but this
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does not concede randomness because this morphological butterfly effect produces selfsimilarity even as it produces diversity” (Chaos 93). Meaning that even in nature what
may seem random at first glance actually consists of deeply complex patterns. Chaos is
not arbitrary; it is constructed by an intricate order. Demastes argues that Valentine’s
description of Thomasina’s leaf algorithm, “provides something of a sense of the rising
order out of chaos, an order that will in fact be reproduced in larger scale in Noakes’s
picturesque style, a landscape initially created by Noakes but then permitted to rise on its
own, a wild (but not random), verdant Arcadia” (Chaos 98).
Demastes emphasizes that the actual math involved in fractals is fairly simple.
What is daunting however is the sheer number of computations necessary in order to
reveal the “ordered, self-similar, scaled patterns actually produced in nature” (Chaos 93).
As such, “[c]omplexity arises from simplicity, as order arises from disorder” (Chaos 93).
Demastes contends that the nineteenth-century section of the play is evidently
“suggesting that a Thomasina could have existed in 1809 because the necessary
information was available and because the social inclination toward ‘irregularity,’ as
attested by the picturesque style, was also culturally available though not pervasive”
(Chaos 96). He also points out that Thomasina is not only intellectually and
mathematically adroit but she is also “very much a part of her age in much the same way
Galileo, Newton, and Einstein were part of theirs” (Chaos 97). Demastes finds this
observation contradictory to the common conception of science as uninfluenced by
culture. Rather, Demastes contends that “the history of science continually verifies the
claim that culture influences science and science influences culture” (Chaos 97). This
thesis attempts to make a similar argument.

30

In spite of her brilliance, Thomasina does not possess the technology to bring her
theories to fruition. Demastes maintains that because Thomasina lacks the technology
“Stoppard introduces the late twentieth-century counterparts to the nineteenth-century
cast, including Valentine, the student of nonlinear mathematics, who provides regular
commentary on the chaotic nature of nature” (Chaos 97). Valentine becomes Stoppard’s
quantum mouthpiece.
Susanne Vees-Gulani makes a connection between Valentine’s statement about
chaos theory getting closer to “the ordinary-sized stuff which is our lives” and
Thomasina’s continuous attempts to find explanations for occurrences in her world. In
her article “Hidden Order in the ‘Stoppard Set’: Chaos Theory in the Content and
Structure of Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia” Vees-Gulani points to Thomasina’s rice pudding
analogy as proof that Thomasina is “…thinking about the irreversibility of processes as
well as the movement towards larger and larger disorder, which is formulated in the
second law of thermodynamics” (Vees-Gulani 414). Chaos theory is presented in the play
mainly through the work of Valentine and Thomasina. Stoppard uses Valentine as the
mouthpiece through which the audience is given the tools to understand “the incredible
event happening in the scenes of the past: the development of chaos theory by a young
girl, Thomasina Coverly” (Vees-Gulani 414). Thomasina realizes “the discrepancy
between the traditional geometrical forms and natural objects.” She spends the three year
time lapse (from 1809 to 1812 that occurs between Act One and Two) trying to find
equations that would lead to natural shapes:
Each week I plot your equations dot for dot, xs against ys in all manner of
algebraical relation, and every week they draw themselves as commonplace
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geometry, as if the world of forms were nothing but arcs and angles. God’s truth,
Septimus, if there is an equation for a curve like a bell, there must be an equation
for one like a bluebell, and if a bluebell, why not a rose? Do we believe nature is
written in numbers? (Arcadia 37).
Thomasina is appalled at the inconsistencies she sees between the magnificently complex
world around her and “commonplace geometry,” and is determined to find a better
explanation.
Susanne Vees-Gulani identifies three “fractals” that constitute the structure of
Arcadia. She argues that Sex, Literature and the Garden are the three major “fractals”
holding the play together. She reasons, “[e]ach of them could be seen as a strange
attractor around which the content evolves” (Vees-Gulani 416). Vees-Gulani maintains
that in setting up the structure of Arcadia, Stoppard follows another principle of chaos
theory as outlined by Gleick: simplicity. She argues “since the play circulates around
similar themes and topics in all three time spheres, it is characterized by simplicity”
(Vees-Gulani 419). Stoppard surrounds the central theme of chaos theory with topics
such as sex, literature and the garden creating a unified structure.
Vees-Gulani identifies the Garden as the third strange attractor in the play.
Always under construction the garden becomes the “…symbol of the change from one
period to another, namely from the Enlightenment to Romanticism” (Vees-Gulani 417).
The garden becomes the perfect juxtaposition of the two opposing ideologies in the play:
the rational order of the Enlightenment and the sentimentality of the Romantics. VeesGulani attributes Stoppard’s use of the garden as one of the structural principles of the
play to Gleick’s Chaos: Making a New Science.
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In his article “Tom Stoppard and ‘Postmodern Science” Daniel Jernigan examines
Tom Stoppard’s employment of chaos theory and quantum mechanics in an effort to
fairly assess whether or not his work can be considered postmodern. Jernigan focuses
specifically on Hapgood and Arcadia reasoning that although these two plays are not as
“theatrically experimental as Stoppard’s earlier work, they nonetheless engage the
concerns of the postmodern era in their adoption of theoretical science” (Jernigan 3).
Jernigan’s connection between postmodernism and quantum mechanics is based on the
explanation given by Jean-François Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on
Knowledge. He argues, “Lyotard recognizes both quantum mechanics and especially
chaos theory as the postmodern theories par excellence, given their radical incredulity
over the possibility of achieving a grand metanarrative description of the universe”
(Jernigan 4).
Jernigan emphasizes that what distinguishes both quantum mechanics and
postmodernism from their ideological predecessors is their rejection of and incredulity
towards a universal scientific or “meta” narrative of reality. He argues that Stoppard is
not a postmodernist because he does not use quantum mechanics to its postmodern
effect.13 But by assuming that Stoppard is merely “normalizing” chaos theory, Jernigan
misses one of the most important and intriguing facets of the play. Although a more
ambiguous ending may have adhered more closely to the postmodern paradigm, it would
have failed to deliver the play’s true message: that we are not helplessly caught in an
13

Jernigan dismissively comments that “Stoppard’s investigation into these theories
seeks to normalize them according to a classical interpretation rather than to revel in their
anti-epistemological implications” (Jernigan 4).
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unpredictable universe over which we have no control, rather that we are a part of an
exceedingly complex and dynamic system in which (although not always predictable)
order eventually emerges.
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CHAPTER II: THE PARALYSIS OF THE NEWTONIAN MIND

Deep in the human consciousness is a pervasive need for a logical universe that makes
sense. But the real universe is always one step beyond logic.
Frank Herbert

In Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Stoppard explores the problem: how do we act
in a world that is no longer predictable? The implications of Heisenberg and Bohr’s
discoveries were staggering to these men and women of science. Suddenly the universe
was no longer knowable. Gone was the clock and all of its neat and orderly parts. There
was no lock to pick – the universe was a writhing mass of possibility and the best these
scientists could hope for was an educated guess. This revelation not only shook their
logic, it shook their faith.
Ros and Guil are doomed not because of their predetermined fate in Hamlet (as
previous critics have suggested) but because of Guil’s refusal to accept the responsibility
of action in a world which is fraught with uncertainty. For Stoppard, the Newtonian
worldview robs the individual of their freedom of choice and action, incapacitating them
through fear of uncertainty. To say that Ros and Guil do not have lives outside of Hamlet
becomes problematic once the two are compared side by side. Although Ros and Guil’s
“lives” are bounded by Stoppard’s play (as any characters of fiction are) their experiences
are not limited by Shakespeare’s. In determining how (and if) Stoppard’s characters
diverge, it is imperative to understand the characters first presented by Shakespeare.
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are introduced in the beginning of Act 2 Scene 2 of
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Hamlet. The first 40 lines of dialogue between the King, the Queen, Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern are nearly replicated in Stoppard’s Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead.
The differences between the two sets of dialogue emerge within the margins (within the
parentheses of the stage direction.)
The scene as presented by Shakespeare is a seemingly simple one: the King and
the Queen welcome two courtiers, childhood friends of their son, whom they have
summoned to assist them in understanding what is plaguing Prince Hamlet. And yet
beneath this presumably straightforward scene is a roiling mass of complexities and
ambiguities. What are the King and Queen’s real motivations? Why have Rosencrantz
and Guildenstern agreed to spy on their friend? Is there anything even really wrong with
Hamlet? These are the very things on which Ros and Guil ponder while in the margins of
Stoppard’s play. Although parts of Ros and Guil’s reality are determined by Hamlet, Ros
and Guil are not. Their characters and experiences remain distinct, even as they
seemingly melt into one another.
In Hamlet Rosencrantz and Guildenstern make their next appearance towards the
end of Act 2 Scene 2. This scene, in which the two courtiers try to glean Hamlet’s
afflictions, is discussed rather than presented in Stoppard’s play. Though Stoppard’s
audience catches the first few exchanges and the last few, the bulk of the discussion is
left to be recapitulated by Ros and Guil. In Hamlet this scene is the first if not longest
instance of sustained dialogue between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern and any of the
other characters. The two remain on stage for three hundred and ten lines during which
Hamlet confronts the two courtiers, Polonious introduces the Player, and Hamlet arranges
the dumb show, The Murder of Gonzago. Although Ros and Guil are not present for all of
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this during Stoppard’s play (Hamlet goes off-stage with Polonious to meet the Player and
then returns with the Player) a close look at this scene reveals that although they
inevitably speak the same lines when they encounter Hamlet, Ros and Guil are hardly
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern.
In Shakespeare’s play, Hamlet greets Rosencrantz and Guildenstern not only in a
friendly manner, but in almost jovial relief: “My [excellent] good friends! How dost thou
Guildenstern? Ah, Rosencrantz! Good lads, how do you both?” (Hamlet II.ii.221-223).
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern reply mildly but Hamlet persists jocularly, almost giddy by
the presence of his friends:
Rosencrantz: As the indifferent children of the earth.
Guildenstern: Happy, in that we are not [over-]happy, on Fortune’s [cap] we are
not the very button.
Hamlet: Nor the soles of her shoes?
Rosencrantz: Neither, my lord.
Hamlet: Than you live about her waist, or in the middle of her favors?
Guildenstern: Faith, in her privates we.
Hamlet: In secret parts of Fortune? O, most true, she is a strumpet. What news?
(Hamlet II.ii.224-233).
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are vague in their answers; it is only Hamlet’s
goading which finally elicits the saucy response from Guildenstern (one that in
Stoppard’s play would be more likely to come out of Ros’s mouth than Guil’s) – which
demonstrates the fact that these men are actually good friends who know each other fairly
well. Presumably it is this familiarity which causes Hamlet to check his enthusiasm in
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greeting his friends and to doubt Rosencrantz’s evasive answer. When Hamlet first
suspects that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are there on the behest of the King and Queen
is unclear; what is clear however is that Hamlet is put on guard during their brief
conversation. When Hamlet calls Rosencrantz on his fib and asks the pointed question:
“But your news is not true. Let me question you in particular. What have you, my good
friends deserv’d at the hands of Fortune that she sends you to prison hither?” (Hamlet
II.ii.235-238). Whether or not Hamlet was suspicious of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern’s
motives before their arrival, their behavior (coupled with his pre-existing paranoia) is
enough to convince Hamlet that their presence is not merely a happy coincidence. Over
the course of the next forty-seven lines Hamlet reposes the same question four times.
Each time Rosencrantz and Guildenstern evade the question. He questions them casually,
“[b]ut in the beaten way of friendship, what make you at Elsinore”; politely, “[w]ere you
not sent for? Is it your own inclining? Is it a free visitation?”; directly, “[y]ou were sent
for, and there is a kind of confession in your looks… I know the good King and Queen
have sent for you”; and finally, exasperated, Hamlet pleads,
“[b]ut let me conjure you, by the rights of our fellowship, by the consonancy of
our youth, by the obligation of our ever-preserv’d love, and by what more dear a
better proposer can charge you withal, be even and direct with me, whether you
were sent for or no!” (Hamlet II.ii.264-280).
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern have been stalling up to this point and even after Hamlet
has appealed to their friendship – the two hesitate. Rosencrantz tries to subtly consult
Guildenstern, “[w]hat say you” but he fails in evading Hamlet’s attention: “[n]ay then I
have an eye of you! – If you love me, hold not off” (Hamlet II. Ii. 284-286). It is
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Guildenstern who finally admits, “[m]y lord, we were sent for” (Hamlet II.ii.287).
Hamlet does not press them to explicitly divulge their orders and Rosencrantz quickly
diverts Hamlet’s attention to the tragedians. When read next to the opening scene of
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, it is difficult to believe that critics have persisted in
conflating the flat, insidious pair of Shakespeare’s play with the perplexed, yet persistent
duo presented by Stoppard.
Like many of the great Western classical thinkers, Guil searches for some
intuitive order in the world around him, and yet like many modern thinkers, Guil seems
to be vaguely aware that if his world is determined he can have no influence in it. Guil
struggles with the very problems Mackey presents as the products of universal
determinism.14 Guil searches for the structure of the world he finds himself in but the
more he searches the more he forfeits his freedom to act. When the Player arrives Guil
pushes him to explain why he has come. What Guil really wants to know is how the
Player knows to come. The failure of the coins to act according to the laws of probability
has robbed Guil of certainty in his own actions. In asking the Player whether it was fate
or chance that brought them there, Guil is really asking what forcers are responsible for
his circumstance. However, when the Player asserts that they have no control, “Oh yes.
We have no control. Tonight we play to the court. Or the night after. Or the tavern. Or
not” (RG 25). Guil reacts by desperately asserting his autonomy from any deterministic
system: “I have influence!” (RG 26).
Rather than embracing the chaos (as Ros arguably does) Guil resists the reality of
what is happening by applying scientific methods of logic and reasoning to the
14

See Mackey quote on p. 5.
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phenomenon at hand, thereby distancing himself emotionally from the situation. Guil
constantly tries to make sense of the world around him through scientific methods. At the
beginning of the play the run of heads in the coin toss offends Guil’s logical and rational
sensibilities. Guil’s application and ultimate rejection of possible theories mirror the
frustrations experienced by scientists like Einstein who struggled to resolve the apparent
randomness of quantum science with the classically determined universe to which they
had grown accustomed. Guil shares this struggle to accept the fact that his world is no
longer predictable. Guil posits, “A weaker man might be moved to re-examine his faith,
if in nothing else at least in the law of probability” (RG 12). With each failed explanation
it becomes harder for Guil to suppress his rising panic or understand the implications of
what is going on around him.
Ros accepts things as they come, a willing participant in the chaotic world in
which he finds himself; while Guil struggles to predict what will come next and what
their move should be rather than reacting to situations as they occur. While Guil is
tempted to reexamine his faith in the basic functioning of the universe, Ros does not seem
concerned with the lack of determinism or probability. The straight run of heads amuses
Ros, perhaps because he is winning, but also because he sees nothing alarming in the
pattern:
Guil: No questions? Not even a pause?
Ros: You spun them yourself.
Guil: Not a flicker of doubt?
Ros: (aggrieved, aggressive) Well, I won – didn’t I? (RG 17).
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Guil expects there to be a predictable pattern of heads and tails because that is what the
laws of probability tell him to expect.
Guil’s tendency to over think and analyze rather than experience and react to the
situation at hand prevents him from making the right decision on the ship and seals the
fates for the characters of both plays. Stoppard seems to be juxtaposing the two
ideologies which struggled over chaos theory. Guil is representative of the residual
classical interpretation of the world, while Ros (and the Player) represent the emergent
quantum view which embraces chaos and the indeterminate aspects of the universe.
Through the actions of both characters Stoppard seems to argue against the classical
interpretation of the universe as inimical to the supremacy to the individual and the
freedom to choose.
While Guil struggles to understand the nature of the reality he finds himself in,
the Player does not seem to be burdened by the same existential dilemmas. In an
indeterminate world the best one can hope for is an educated guess of future events but
Guil does not like to be unprepared. When the Player describes the different
performances Ros and Guil can take part in Guil is scandalized by the vulgarity of the
performances. Guil is so appalled that he reacts with physical violence by “smashing the
Player across the face” (RG 26). Guil is offended not only by the obscene nature of what
the Player presents but by the surprise. Based on his classical view of the world it is not
how Guil expects the players to behave:
(shaking with rage and fright): It could have been – it didn’t have to be obscene…
It could have been – a bird out of season, dropping bright-feathered on my
shoulder… It could have been a tongueless dwarf standing by the road to point the
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way… I was prepared. But it’s this, is it? No enigma, no dignity, nothing
classical15, portentous, only this – a comic pornographer and a rabble of
prostitutes… (RG 27).
What really seems to disturb Guil however is the assuredness with which the Player
travels through the world.
Ros, on the other hand, does not seem alarmed by the players’ appearance. Rather
than looking for the pattern, Ros reacts to the changes in his environment. Instead of
creating an intellectual distance between himself and his reality, Ros is able to truly be in
the moment and react rather than struggling to predict. Comically, Ros’s reaction to the
Player’s proposition is the antithesis of Guil’s. Rather than being shocked and disgusted,
Ros is titillated and intrigued.
The dual nature of the Player as a character of both Hamlet and Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern allows him to hold a world view more in line with chaos than any classical
interpretation. If Rosencrantz and Guildenstern exists in the margins of Hamlet then the
Player represents the point at which the two become blurred. While Ros and Guil are
excluded for the most part from the Hamlet frame story, the Player moves easily between
the two in a self-assured way that infuriates Guil.
Guil: Well… aren’t you going to change into your costume?
Player: I never change out of it, sir.
Guil: Always in character.
Player: That’s it.
Pause
15

My emphasis.
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Guil: Aren’t you going to – come on?
Player: I am on.
Guil: But if you are on, you can’t come on. Can you?
Player: I start on (RG 34).
When the Player asserts that they have no control he is acknowledging the limitation of
human epistemology to have a total fixed world view which allows him to predict the
trajectory of his future. He embraces the many roles we all play and the fact that at any
given moment we are all characters adapting to different scenes. Though the Player has
been criticized as the most absurd character in the play, he is not extending a nihilistic
view of a meaningless and random universe. He instead embraces whatever role the
situation calls for and embraces the chance and randomness of his world with the
conviction that order will inevitably arise out of disorder. This is an idea which Stoppard
later explores in Hapgood.
Guil decides that he has no choice because of his fear of participation in an
unpredictable and chaotic world: “At least we are presented with alternatives… but not
choice” (RG 39). Guil refuses to accept that they have an option to choose. According to
his pre-determined worldview the decision has been made and should be part of a
predictable pattern of actions that he can logically deduce. However, as chaos theory
affirms, the world is not always logical or predictable and though a pattern may later
become apparent, it is impossible for human beings as a part of this spontaneous pattern
to understand the pattern as it evolves. Once the pair encounters the Hamlet characters,
Guil is willing to relinquish any responsibility for action:
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There’s a logic at work – it’s all done for you, don’t worry. Enjoy it. Relax. To be
taken in hand and led, like a child again, even without innocence, a child – it’s
like being given a prize, an extra slice of childhood when you least expect it, as a
prize for being good, or compensation for never having had one… (RG 40).
Guil is more than happy to relinquish his control to a predetermined reality. When events
are predetermined one is relieved of the burden of choice like a child who relies on the
decisions of his or her parents. The problem with this mode of thinking (Stoppard seems
to suggest) is that because of chaos theory we now know that the world is not
predetermined and we are part of a chaotic universe which requires us to act in order to
effect change. As much as individuals are affected by chaos, as a part of the chaotic
universe they have the potential for unpredictability and choice.
In a role-reversal from the previous scene, Ros has been prompted to action by
their circumstance and Guil (now complacent at the slightest hint of a pre-determined
path) is indifferent to any action outside of that: “Words, words. They’re all we have to
go on” (RG 41). Ultimately it is this complacency and indifference which inhibits the pair
from any autonomous movement. Ros struggles to understand their present situation so
that he may act. While Ros labors to parse their vague exchange with Hamlet, Guil
merely repeats what has been said. Ros tries to get Guil to go with him after Hamlet but
Guil reasons “Why? They’ve got us placed now – if we start moving around, we’ll all be
chasing each other all night” (RG 41). As Ros observes, Guil’s refusal to act makes the
two characters spectators.16 Guil no longer wants to struggle to understand, he is content
to wait and see what happens next: “Wheels have been set in motion, and they have their
16

“I feel like a spectator – an appalling business” (RG 41).
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own pace, to which we are… condemned. Each move is dictated by the previous one –
that is the meaning of order. If we start being arbitrary it’ll just be a shambles: at least, let
us hope so” (RG 60). Guil is unwilling to act because he is afraid to act. He does not
know the initial conditions and he cannot predict what will come next. Rather than
struggling to understand, Guil concedes to a higher determinism to propel his course.
Unfortunately for Guil, his world is fraught with uncertainty and it is impossible to
predict how action (and even inaction) will affect his circumstances.
Ros and Guil are not the only characters in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern who
cannot predict the chain of events that make up their world. Stoppard emphasizes the
separate sphere of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern through the interactions between Ros,
Guil and the Player. While all three are part of Hamlet, their roles in Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern are separate. Though the Player seems to have some notion of Hamlet’s
trajectory, he is just as subject to uncertainty in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern as Ros and
Guil:
It was not until the murderer’s long soliloquy that we were able to look around;
frozen as we were in profile, our eyes searched you out, first confidently, then
hesitantly, then desperately as each patch of turf, each log, every exposed corner
in every direction proved uninhabited (RG 64).
The Player’s vulnerability is demonstrated by the surprise, hurt and confusion he feels as
a result of Ros and Guil’s disappearance earlier in the play. Robbed of observers, the
players are trapped between their roles as characters in the dumb show and characters of
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. Like a photon in an indeterminate state, the players
depend on their observers to define their role and their identities.
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The Player makes Stoppard’s strongest argument for a quantum world view that
embraces uncertainty rather than enforcing a Newtonian order which is incongruent to the
natural state of things. The Player challenges Guil’s view of uncertainty and chaos as a
glitch in the orderly predetermined system of nature:
Player: Uncertainty is in the normal state. You’re nobody special.
Guil: But for God’s sake what are we supposed to do?!
Player: Relax. Respond. That’s what people do. You can’t go through life
questioning your situation at every turn.
Guil: But we don’t know what’s going on, or what to do with ourselves. We don’t
know how to act.
Player: Act natural. You know why you’re here at least.
Guil: We only know what we’re told, and that’s little enough. And for all we
know it isn’t even true.
Player: For all anyone knows, nothing is. Everything has to be taken on trust;
truth is only that which is taken to be true. It’s the currency of living.
There may be nothing behind it, but it doesn’t make any difference so long
as it is honoured (RG 66-67).
In this exchange the classical is pitted against the quantum. Guil has refused to act
because he does not have all of the facts but the Player asserts that it is impossible to ever
have all of the facts. This is in part because, as Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle
proved, the world is not predictable. Uncertainty and order coincide to complete the
disorderly order of our universe. It also refutes any acquisition of absolute knowledge or
truth. As the Uncertainty Principle reified, the best that can be hoped for is an educated
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conjecture and gone are the days of the clock-work universe which only needs to be taken
apart. The Player at the same time emphasizes the importance of action. All one can do is
react and trust that some of one’s assumptions are true; but there is never anyway to
know for sure. As long as this is honored the uncertainty does nOt matter. Guil’s
pragmatic and classical temperament creates a mental block which prevents him from
opening his mind to uncertainty and all its possibilities.
When Ros shouts for Hamlet, Hamlet appears demonstrating that Ros and Guil
are capable of effecting change if they choose to do so (RG 90). However, Ros is only
able to convince Guil to act when Hamlet tells them to go on to the ship headed for
England:
Ros: He said we can go. Cross my heart.
Guil: I like to know where I am. Even if I don’t know where I am, I like to know
that. If we go there’s no knowing.
Ros: No knowing what?
Guil: If we’ll ever come back.
Ros: We don’t want to come back.
Guil: That may very well be true, but do we want to go?
Ros: We’ll be free (RG 95).
Ros intuits that the only way to effect change is through action. As the Player explained,
they must react and trust some assumptions to be true if they want to move through their
uncertain world. Though Guil does act he does so begrudgingly and only on Ros and
Hamlet’s behest. His action is not indicative of any acceptance of uncertainty; rather, he
clings to the next determined environment he encounters (the boat) and so stubbornly
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refuses to engage in his reality by acting that he seals the fate of all of the characters in
both plays.
Although Guil finally accepts that he has some freedom to act, he limits his
freedom to that which keeps him comfortably within the bounds of his determinate
course. Guil relaxes considerably once on the boat headed to bring Prince Hamlet to
England. He takes comfort in the contained nature of the boat: “Yes, I’m very fond of
boats myself I like the way they’re – contained. You don’t have to worry about which
way to go, or whether to go at all – the question doesn’t arise, because you’re on a boat,
aren’t you” (RG 100). Guil enjoys the limited freedom the boat affords him because he
doesn’t have to worry about straying outside of the pre-determined course that he
believes exists:
Free to move, speak, extemporize, and yet. We have not been cut loose. Our
truancy is defined by one fixed star, and our drift represents merely a slight
change of angle to it: we may seize the moments, toss it around while the
moments pass, a short dash here, an exploration there, but we are brought round
full circle to face again the single immutable fact – that we, Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern, bearing a letter from one king to another are taking Hamlet to
England (RG 101).
While Ros struggles to understand the chaos around him and act on his best assumptions,
Guil easily embraces what his classical sentiments understand: an ordered and predictable
path.
This inability to open his mind to uncertainty cripples Guil to the point that he
loses all human empathy and seals his own fate when he chooses not to act and reseals
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the letter. Both characters are challenged in the climactic scene in which they read the
contents of the King’s letter and realize that their mission is to escort young Hamlet to his
death. Ros reacts emotionally, “We’re his friends” (RG 110). Guil, resistant as always to
action, argues that they have no way of knowing this and that they have only been told
they are friends of Hamlet. Echoing the Player, Ros argues that what they are told is all
they have to depend on. Guil attempts to reason his way out of action:
… Well, he is a man, he is mortal, death comes to us all, etcetera, and
consequently he would have died anyway, sooner or later. Or to look at it from
the social point of view – he’s just one man among many, the loss would be well
within reason and convenience… Or look at it another way – we are little men, we
don’t know the ins and outs of the matter, there are wheels within wheels, etcetera
– it would be presumptuous of us to interfere with the designs of fate or even of
kings. All in all, I think we’d be well advised to leave well alone. Tie up the letter
– there – neatly – like that. – They won’t notice the broken seal (RG 110).
Guil would rather sacrifice the life of his presumed friend than step outside of his
newfound determined course. Ros is unmoved by Guil’s cold, selfishly pragmatic
rationalization. Ros is not willing to risk his friend’s life. He tries to persuade through
emotion, “He’s done nothing to us” but to no avail. Ultimately Guil’s fear of action keeps
him from reacting sympathetically to Hamlet’s danger. Though Ros ultimately does not
oppose Guil’s decision, he does not endorse it: “It’s awful” (RG 111). Guil realizes his
mistake too late. Only at the very end does Guil realize the folly of refusing to act: “There
must have been a moment, at the beginning, where we could have said – no. But
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somehow we missed it” (RG 125). Guil’s fear of uncertainty paralyzes him to the point
that he allows himself to be propelled to his own death.
Guil is so desperate to ignore any indication that they have made a wrong choice
because acknowledging that mistake would mean they would have to abandon the
predetermined course laid before them and return to the realm of the indeterminate. Guil
becomes increasingly panicked as he consistently fails to satisfactorily apply logic to
their situation. The fact that he cannot successfully trace effects back to their causes is
maddening to the ever pragmatic Guil. He is so desperate to understand the order of the
system he’s in that Guil readily clings to the first opportunity for deterministic
movement. Aboard the ship, Guil is finally at peace because he is no longer an
autonomous agent in an indeterminate reality. He is confined within the ship and
therefore is bound to the ship’s trajectory. But this false sense of security is what lulls
Guil into making his last decision – a decision that seals the fate of both plays.
Chaos theory opens the door for change, but Guil’s desperate adherence to the
Newtonian paradigm prevents him from seeing any way out. Only because in Guil’s mind
the universe consists of “wheels within wheels” is he bound to the deterministic tug of
the system. He cannot see that determinism is no longer the operating ideology; his world
is dynamic and fraught with uncertainty – much like our own. It is Guil’s failure to
perceive uncertainty as possibility –freedom to choose – that damns him, not
Shakespeare. Stoppard dramatizes the folly in allowing uncertainty to paralyze you to the
point of inaction.
From the beginning of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern the audience is faced with
the crux of the paradox of complementarity: entities can exist in opposite states
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simultaneously. The audience is told that Ros and Guil are dead and yet there they are
tossing coins. Audience members who are familiar with Hamlet will know that indeed
“Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead” (Hamlet V.ii.353). And yet… there they are
watching the dumb show, struggling to understand what is right in front of them. For the
audience, Ros and Guil are simultaneously alive and dead; simultaneously characters in
Shakespeare’s play and Stoppard’s. Although they may be doomed by Hamlet and by the
title, their anxieties are real, their choices are real and their struggle to understand the
indeterminate world they occupy is real. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern may be dead but
Ros and Guil remain caught in a system in which their opportunities to create new exists
are clouded by their staunch dedication to the classical mechanical theory of the world
and their underestimation of the potential impact of the trivial. For Ros and Guil what is
determinate are their roles in Hamlet. What takes place in the margins of Hamlet however
becomes the indeterminate realm of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. In this indeterminate
realm even the most trivial decisions can have an incalculable impact. What Ros and Guil
do not realize is that they did have a chance to change the course of their destiny, only it
was such a fleeting and seemingly inconsequential moment; they allowed it to pass them
by.
The world does not work in the neat orderly manner Newton laid out, but we still
must act within it as a part of it. Nature may be imbued with chaos and uncertainty but so
are human beings. People do not fall neatly into ‘either/or’ categories rather they are a
mass of contradictions, inconsistencies and complexities. The prediction of human
behavior is as difficult as predicting whether light will present itself as particle or wave.
The same complexities that quantum science seeks to explain in Nature also present
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themselves in individuals. Our actions have incalculable potential and there is no
predicting the ramifications of even the most trivial act. Stoppard suggests that rather
than lamenting the loss of order (as Guil and Einstein do) we should rejoice in throwing
off the oppressive shackles of the clock work universe. By recognizing the complexities
inherent in ourselves, we can identify with the perspective presented by chaos theory,
rather than fearing uncertainty. Without uncertainty there would be no opportunity for
change or creation. As autonomous agents in this dynamic system we have the power to
affect change through our choice of actions within that system.
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CHAPTER III: LIGHT, IDENTITY, AND THE INESCAPABLE REALITY OF
UNCERTAINTY

Physics is not important, love is.
Richard Feynman17

Although Hapgood was not a critical success it effectively furthered Stoppard’s
argument for the complexity of human personality. While in Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern Stoppard allowed select paradigms of quantum science to inform his play,
in Hapgood he infuses the very structure of the play with Heisenberg’s Uncertainty
principle. By juxtaposing the indeterminacy and complementarity of light particles with
the subtleties and complexities of identity, Stoppard creates a parallel between the two
emphasizing their dependence on an observer and their fluid nature. The parallel
demonstrates the reality of chaotic aspects in our own nature, thereby establishing human
beings as fundamental agents in the universe who are just as unpredictable as their
universe. Stoppard argues for a ‘both/and’ perspective in a world in which the ‘either/or’
paradigm is antithetical not only to the reality of the universe but also to the reality of
human identity - both of which can be said to have infinite and contradictory possible
manifestations that only become fixed when someone observes it from a specific point of
view.

17

In a letter to Marcus Chown’s mother written at the behest of her son to convey the
importance of physics. Richard Feynman is considered the “greatest theoretical physicist
of his generation” (Gribbin 91).
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The Double Slit Experiment demonstrates the ultimate ‘either/or’ question of
quantum science: Is light either a wave or a particle? The answer of course is that light
consists of both waves and particles. As discussed in the introduction, the double-slit
experiment reveals the indeterminate nature of light as both particle and wave. The
problem was there was no way to predict which it would present: particle or wave? Any
attempt to observe the photons passing through the slit only served to produce what the
observer was looking for: particles or waves. The deeper scientists probed, the more
unsatisfactory the ‘either/or’ paradigm became; nature simply did not function in this
manner. Experiment after experiment proved not only was the clock work model
obsolete, but so was the ‘either/or’ logic on which it depended. Quantum theory,
however, provided an alternative: the possibility that entities in the universe could both
be one thing and another. Like light being both particle and wave, quantum theory
challenged the world to open its mind to the realization that in nature things are rarely
‘either/or’. Increasingly the ‘both/and’ world view began to better reflect the realities of
the world.
Stoppard constructs a plot, which not only allows him to explore the intricacies of
quantum science and identity, but self-reflexively reinforces these concepts. The play
begins with a failed experiment which leads the characters to develop a hypothesis
(Ridley is the double agent). The hypothesis is tested in the second act of the play with
another experiment (the trap for Ridley). The scientific structure works on two levels.
First, the movement of characters in the experiment is reminiscent of the movement of
particles in a double slit experiment. The men’s bath house in which the first scene is set
has four doors by which characters can come and go. The scene opens with a whirlwind

54

of entrances and exits by a number of characters. The bathhouse which is described as
circumnavigable makes it particularly difficult to determine which doors characters are
going into or coming out of. The introduction of twins increases the difficulty to the point
that it is nearly impossible to predict the movements of characters or even determine who
they are. Like in the double slit experiment it is impossible to tell which door (hole) the
character (photon) will go through. With the introduction of twins it becomes impossible
to tell which twin we are seeing.
Each experiment reveals the complexity of identity and the importance of the
observer. The experiments (like the double slit experiment) the indeterminacy and
complementarity of identity. In the first scene, both the Russian twins and the Ridley
twins cause chaos because the agents do not know which twin to follow. In the final
experiment, Hapgood pretends to be her own twin Celia while Ridley continues to
pretend not to be the spy he really is. There is the added complication in the inter-scene
of the second act when Ridley suddenly makes a ‘quantum leap’ and becomes his twin.18
Through juxtaposition Stoppard explores the indeterminacy and complementarity
of identity, and through the lens of quantum science constructs a plot which inherently
demonstrates the wisdom of accepting a ‘both/and’ quantum world view and the folly of
sticking to the ‘either/or’ Newtonian perspective. For most of the second scene the
audience is faced with the mysterious complementarity of identity. Throughout the entire
second experiment the audience must question what it is seeing: Hapgood or Celia?
Ridley or Ridley’s twin? It was in response to the wave-particle duality that Niels Bohr
18

This mirrors the quantum phenomenon of an electron’s ability to change quantum
states. Momentarily in a superposition of states, an electron “jumps” to a different energy
level.
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coined the term “complementarity.” Bohr considered “an entity such as an electron as
neither a wave nor a particle but something different” (Gribbin 16). Rather than forcing
the ‘either/or’ Bohr settles for a more realistic concept of light has both particle and wave
depending on the observer.
Within this structure, Stoppard uses twins to convey the indeterminacy of identity
by highlighting the fundamental unreliability of appearances. The twin motif is
introduced almost immediately in the first act. As Hapgood and her team lie in wait for
their Russian ‘sleeper’ turned ‘joe’ Kerner to meet his contact Georgi, they are
unpleasantly surprised by the appearance of twin Russian agents.19 Merryweather, a
member of Hapgood’s team assigned with the job of tailing the Russian contact,
unwittingly follows one twin in and the other twin out; completely unaware that he is
tailing two different people. These are not the last set of twins to appear in the play.
When Ridley is discovered to be the double agent, Kerner and Hapgood correctly
conclude (on the basis of the bridges of Königsberg) that Ridley has been passing
information to the Russians with the help of his twin. In order to catch Ridley and his
twin in the act, Hapgood must pretend to be her own twin, Celia Newton. Katherine Kelly
argues that like the dual nature of light, “twins insidiously undermine all notions of fixity
– fixed time, fixed space, personal identity, and reliable perception” (Kelly 151). In the
world of espionage, twins make particularly adept agents because they defy surveillance.
However, twins are not the only representations of doubles in the play. Almost every
19

John Fleming provides the following definitions: “[a] ‘sleeper’ is an agent who is sent
in years in advance and establishes himself or herself as an ordinary citizen preparing for
the moment when he or she will be activated and required to pass on vital pieces of
information. A ‘joe’ is an agent who has been turned to work for the other side” (Fleming
177).
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character in Hapgood is a double in some way. The play suggests that this notion of
“twinning” (that two possibilities can exist simultaneously) is a fundamental part of
human nature.
By presenting characters that carry multiple identities (depending on the context
in which they are viewed) Stoppard makes a strong case for the complementarity of
identity. Complementarity is demonstrated in Hapgood by the numerous and varied
monikers given to the characters. Kerner is one of Hapgood’s ‘joes’ but he is also Josef,
her former lover whom she still affectionately refers to sometimes as Joe. He is the father
of her son, who is also named Joe. Not only does Hapgood have many ‘Joes/joes’ (some
of which are Joes on multiple levels) in her life, but she also goes by a number of
different names. To the agents and ‘joes’ that she runs she is Hapgood or her code name
‘Mother’.20 At work Hapgood is ‘Mother’, at home she is Mum. At times Hapgood also
goes by ‘Mrs. Hapgood’ (the title of course being a courtesy as she is unmarried).
Hapgood’s handles become more personal, depending on the level of intimacy with other
characters. To Blair, who is both her boss and (it is suggested) her occasional lover, she is
alternately Hapgood and Elizabeth. Kerner on the other hand refers to her affectionately
by the Russian translation of her name: Yelizaveta or Lilichka and in the diminutive,
Lilya. Once she assumes the role of her own twin sister, Celia Newton, Hapgood refers to
herself (herself being Hapgood not Celia) as ‘Betty’ and is dubbed ‘Auntie’ by Ridley.
Fleming argues that, “the lack of a single, fixed name alludes to the changing, divided
nature of her individual identity and the motif of ambiguous nomenclature runs
20

Blair explains to Wates: “[t]here is a son but she was called Mother when she joined
the Defence Liaison Committee – the tea would arrive and the Minister would say,
‘Who’s going to be mother?” (Hapgood 27).
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throughout the play, reinforcing the theme that everyone has multiple identities”
(Fleming 184). The reality of multiple identities is one which Kerner readily embraces,
Blair rejects, and Hapgood hopelessly tries to juggle.
Like Einstein and Bohr, Stoppard pits the classical ‘either/or’ Blair against
quantum ‘both/and’ Kerner to highlight the inevitable fallibilities in ‘either/or’ thinking
and to emphasize the two extremes Hapgood is caught between. The concept of multiple
identities is first voiced by Kerner in the second scene of the first act as he obliquely
answers Blair’s query as to where his loyalties lie: East or West. Kerner prefaces his
answer with a description of the double slit experiment and the dual nature of light. When
Blair fails to grasp the significance of this Kerner answers more directly:
Somehow light is particle and wave. The experimenter makes the choice. You get
what you interrogate for. And you want to know if I’m a wave or a particle. I
meet my Russian friend Georgi, and we exchange material. When the experiment
is over, you have a result: because I have given Georgi enough information to
keep him credible as a KGB control who is running me as a sleeper – which is
what he thinks he is. (Hapgood 12).
Kerner’s easy acceptance of the duality of both light and identity is not only because of
the fact that he is a physicist but also that as an individual, Kerner must balance a number
of roles and identities.21 Because of his own bifurcated identity, Kerner has ceased to
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In Theatre of Chaos: Beyond Absurdism, into Orderly Disorder, William Demastes
charts Kerner’s many roles: “[h]e is both physicist and secret agent, by birth German and
Russian (having been born in the German city of Königsberg (which was annexed as
Russian after World War II and renamed Kaliningrad), by current affiliation both Russian
and British (working for both governments), by inclination an artist though by training a
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operate within the restrictive Newtonian ‘either/or’ mindset and has adopted the
‘both/and’ quantum world view. If Kerner is the character in the play who most embraces
the implications of wave-particle duality, Blair is the most resistant. In Hapgood, Blair
represents the staunchly Newtonian mindset, still mired in binaries and hopelessly
trapped in an ‘either/or’ world.
Because Blair fails to grasp the fluidity of identity, he imposes strict ‘either/or’
boundaries on his and Hapgood’s relationship. By denying the inherent complexity of life
and identity, Blair ruins their relationship and dramatizes the folly of ‘either/or’ thinking.
Blair is woefully out of step with the new sciences as Stoppard makes clear in the third
scene of the first act: “[a]nti-particles. Do you know what they are? They were never
mentioned by Democritus who was the pro-particle chap when I was at school”
(Hapgood 18). Blair goes on to admit, “I gave a chap a job with us once because he said
he’d read physics and I thought he meant the book by Aristotle” (Arcadia 18). Both of
these ancient philosophers were determinists who rejected chance and chaos and strove
for a more ordered understanding of the world. With this ideological background it is not
surprising that Blair fails to grasp Kerner’s meaning.22 Blair’s mindset is militantly
‘either/or’: either with us or against us; either Russian or British; either technical or
personal he maintains distinct boundaries. The only area in Blair’s life which becomes
blurred is his relationship with Hapgood.
scientist, fluent in both Russian and English, lover and employee of Hapgood (the father
of her son)” (Chaos 44).
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Demastes argues: “the thing that quantum mechanics challenges – the notion of an
objective, rationalist grounding of reality – is the thing the chief British officer, Blair,
needs so desperately to understand in order to recover stolen, nationally sensitive
property. It is, however, the thing Blair refuses to grasp” (Chaos 44).
59

The tenuous relationship that exists between Hapgood and Blair is clearly divided
into two definite spheres: personal or technical. The boundaries of their relationship are
established in the second scene of the first act:
Blair: Don’t pack it in yet, I need you.
Hapgood: I suppose that’s technical, is it?
Blair: I suppose so.
Hapgood: Just making sure. I was calling you at the pool this morning. Where
were you?
Blair: I was there.
Hapgood: I needed you.
Blair: No, no, that was only personal. But you’re going to need me now (Hapgood
24).
Hapgood’s sarcastic quip “I suppose that’s technical, is it?” suggests that this is not the
first time the two have had a conversation on this issue. The scene also establishes Blair’s
priorities. Blair will always choose the technical over the personal. In his mind they both
need each other technically, but she is not allowed to need him personally if it conflicts
with the technical. The ultimate demonstration of Blair’s true loyalty occurs at the end of
the play. After agreeing with Hapgood that it would be too dangerous to include her son
in the trap for Ridley, Blair goes against her wishes and without her knowledge brings
Joe to the pool.23 For Blair what matters is not the safety of a little boy, but the safety of
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Fleming makes the assertion that “Blair surrenders his personal relationship with
Hapgood and risks her son’s safety because for him individual people are sometimes
pawns that must be sacrificed to win the “larger” game of international espionage”
(Fleming 187).
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the ‘Service’ and all its secrets. When faced with either the life of a child or getting the
upper hand on the KGB, Blair chooses the latter.
Blair’s decision is antithetical to the decision Kerner has made before the play
starts: to give the Russians his anti-particle research in exchange for his son’s safety. In
the first scene of the second act, Kerner confesses that over a year ago the Russians found
out about his and Hapgood’s son Joe and threatened his life if Kerner did not hand over
his research. Although this story is supposed to be part of the ruse meant to lure Ridley
into revealing his twin, both Hapgood and Blair realize that Kerner has ‘made up the
truth’ (Hapgood 88). When Blair confronts him later Kerner coolly replies,
Yes – no, either – or… You have been too long in the spy business, you think
everybody has no secret or one big secret, they are what they seem or they are the
opposite. You look at me and think: Which is he? Plus or minus? If only you
could figure it out like looking into me to find my root. And then you still
wouldn’t know. We’re all doubles. Even you (Hapgood 72).
Although Blair sees him as a traitor for giving confidential information to the Russians,
Kerner does not see himself as a traitor. He does not view himself as either a Russian
sleeper or a British joe, rather he understands that he is both a spy and a father. In
Kerner’s mind the East and the West are both relatively corrupt and what deserves his
protection and loyalty are not either of these but his eleven year old son.24
Blair refuses to recognize the fluidity of identity. When Blair finally tires of
Kerner’s quantum metaphors he explodes “You’re this or you’re that, and you know
24

Delaney argues this scene demonstrates that “Kerner seems to think not so much in
terms of ideology as in terms of the responsibility he bears as an individual in dealing
with other individuals” (Delaney 139).
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which. Physics is a detail I can’t afford, I’ve got one of my people working the inside
lane on false papers and if she’s been set up I’ll feed you to the crocodiles – is that real
enough for you?” (Hapgood 73). Kerner’s response foreshadows Blair’s decision at the
end of the play: “One of your people? Oh, Paul. You would betray her before I would. My
mamushka” (Hapgood 73).25 When they are in the technical realm Blair expects to deal
with Hapgood. When they are in the personal realm Paul expects Elizabeth. Blair does
not tolerate either world interfering with the other. He doesn’t grasp that Hapgood and
Elizabeth are two sides of the same person and sometimes the technical becomes
personal. When Hapgood calls out to Blair at the end of the first act, she is not calling as
an employee reporting to her boss, she is calling as an upset lover and she receives no
answer. Although Hapgood has already experienced her personal world interfere with her
technical world, Blair is unwilling to cave on his boundaries. When she radios, Blair
expects to hear Hapgood reporting in but it is Elizabeth calling out. He ignores her call,
choosing the technical over the personal for the first but not last time in the play.Blair
refuses to accept the uncertainty of reality. However, the world is not static and neither
are the individuals that populate it. By denying the complementarity of identity Blair not
only fails to see the answer to his case but also drives Hapgood away.
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Delaney posits: “although Blair may perceive Kerner’s statement as evidence of
continuing loyalty to the West, Kerner is actually saying that he places a higher premium
on not betraying a particular person - much as he would protect his own mother – than on
giving away scientific secrets” (Delaney 138). Delaney uses this as a basis to ultimately
pit the two against each other: “[a]s opposed to Kerner’s poignant concern for persons,
the urbane organization man Blair is the prim exemplar in the play of the elevation of
corporate interests above any interest in individuals… Blair sees persons ultimately in
terms of their instrumental worth, as tools, chess pieces, to be used” (Delaney 140).
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The play juxtaposes the ideologically opposed Blair and Kerner, setting the stage
for the crux of the play: Hapgood’s decision about her own identity – between her role as
‘Mother’ and Mum. Hapgood’s conversion from an ‘either/or’ to a ‘both/and’ perspective
begins with the birth of her son – an experience which teaches her the inevitable
superposition of states in life. Hapgood is not only calculatingly brilliant, she is an
excellent manager and spy and the first and only woman in the Service. However, since
the birth of her son Hapgood feels increasingly torn between her professional or technical
world (her job) and her personal one (her son and the men she loves). She slowly allows
her personal world to encroach upon her technical. When Blair admonishes Hapgood for
sending Joe a postcard while on a covert operation, she hotly responds:
No, you’re right, I break the rules, and if Matron is KGB it’s going to be all over
Dzerzhinsky Square – Hapgood was in Vienna. Well, I keep missing things, last
time I missed him in Robin Hood even if he was only a tree, and if I can’t send
him a rotten postcard you can take Vienna and stick it up your – (Hapgood 22).
Hapgood cannot suppress the guilt she feels for putting her son in boarding school but
realizes that her job is incompatible with the demands of a full-time parent:
He’d have to put himself to bed four times a week even when I’m working out of
Half Moon Street – I already run the only intelligence network in the Western
world which exhibits seasonal fluctuations, and it’s only a matter of time before
somebody works out it’s the school holidays. Anyway, there’s the male society
thing, they’re supposed to need that when they haven’t got a father (Hapgood 23).
Hapgood’s guilt is not merely because she feels that she is an absent mother, but also
because she feels she has robbed her son of his father, all in the name of business.
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Hapgood’s relationship with Kerner is a constant tug of war between her personal
and professional sensibilities. On one hand, Joseph Kerner is the Russian sleeper she
turned: her ‘star joe’. She is ferociously proud of this: “Kerner is my joe! I turned him”
(Hapgood 43). On the other, he is her Joe – lover and father to their son. As Ridley
explains to Celia (who is actually Hapgood):
She got pregnant screwing the Russians, Auntie. Then it was a choice between
losing a daddy and losing a prize double, a turned mole who would have been
blown overnight if he was known to be the father, and we aren’t in the daddy
business, we’re in the mole business (Hapgood 81).
Once Kerner is blown and there are no professional limitations to their relationship,
Hapgood clumsily tries to reinitiate the personal relationship that she has rejected all
along: “I won’t need you any more, I mean I’ll need you again – oh, sugar! – you know
what I mean – do you want to marry me? I think I’d like to be married” (Hapgood 50).
Hapgood struggles to recover what she has lost (her family) in the name of business.
However, just as Hapgood is realizing the depth of her feeling, Kerner is more
convinced than ever that their relationship was never more than business for her. He
reproachfully reminds her:
If I loved you it was so long ago I had to tell you in Russian and you kept the tape
running. It was not a safe house for love. The spy was falling in love with the
case-officer, you could hear it on the playback. One day you switched off the
hidden microphone and got pregnant (Hapgood 50).
He responds incredulously to her protestations of love: “You interrogated me. Weeks,
months, every day. I was your thought, your objective… If love was like that it would not
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even be healthy” (Hapgood 50). His constant and cynical denial brings forth the true
force of Hapgood’s love: “(Flares) That’s a damned lie! You unspeakable cad!”
(Hapgood 50). The normally prim Hapgood, the unflappable spy mistress is finally
pushed to profanity. However, the tenderness between the two is truly felt after Kerner
reveals his plans to return home:
Hapgood: You mustn’t say that to me, Joseph. Please don’t say it.
(Kerner comforts her.)
Kerner: Milaya moya, rodnaya moya26… it’s all right. I am your Joe.
(She suffers his embrace, then softens into it.) (Hapgood 51).
Despite what has transpired between them there is a gentleness to their exchanges that
suggests their relationship was more than Kerner claims it was and more than Hapgood
believed it to be.
Until the final scene of the play, Hapgood has consistently chosen the technical
over the personal. Once she assumes her role as her own twin Celia Newton, Hapgood is
allowed to step outside of herself and not only take an objective look but fully become
her antithesis. Ridley (for whom the ruse is intended) describes Celia as “a pot-head…
she won’t stop talking, she bites her nails, she looks like shit” (Hapgood 66). As her own
sister, Hapgood allows herself surprisingly honest self-reflection: “having the kid was
good for her, she always thought the delinquents had the bastards and the scholarship
girls had the wedding. It shook up her view of the world” (Hapgood 77). As the
conversation revolves around Joe, Ridley becomes increasingly bitter, “she should have
given him a daddy instead of getting her buzz out of running joes to please an old bastard
26

My darling, my darling…
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who doesn’t want her and never will… Blair’s been running her for years!” (Hapgood
81). In a line that cuts right to the heart of the matter Ridley sardonically remarks: “Betty
bought the whole lie and put it first, she is the lie” (Hapgood 82). Hapgood has dedicated
her life and sacrificed her family for her work, but once her technical world begins to
threaten her personal one, Hapgood draws the line.
Blair’s betrayal ultimately allows Hapgood to make the ideological break
necessary to leave her technical world and fully assume her role in her personal one.27
Not only does Blair betray her trust by bringing her son into a potentially dangerous
situation against her express wishes, but he does so knowing full well what her reaction
will be:
Hapgood: I’ll never forgive you for that, never ever.
Blair: I know that. I knew that. (Hapgood 86).
Despite the fact that Blair knew his actions would be detrimental to his personal
relationship with Hapgood, he refused to allow it to affect his technical decisions. What
he did not anticipate was that once Hapgood’s technical world endangered the very center
of her personal one, she would choose being Mum over “Mother”.28 Trying to bring her
back to ‘reality’ Blair poses the ultimate ‘either/or’ question:
Blair: It’s them or us, isn’t it?
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Fleming observes, “for ten years Hapgood chose the values of the technical over the
values of the personal, but now, after killing Ridley and seeing Blair, the man she most
wanted, place her son’s life in jeopardy, she disavows her profession” (Fleming 189).
28

Kelly reasons: “the process of confirming Ridley’s double (and double cross) also
confirmed Blair’s Newtonian rigidity and Hapgood’s post-Newtonian flexibility” (Kelly
157).
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Hapgood: Who? Us and the KGB? The opposition! We’re just keeping each other
in business, we should send each other Christmas cards – oh, f-f-fuck it, Paul!
(Hapgood 87).
The two Hapgoods collapse as the mother reacts to Blair’s careless use of her child and
‘Mother’ realizes that the game she thought she was playing isn’t real at all.
In summary, through quantum physics Stoppard argues for the complexity and
unpredictability of individual personality and in doing so he emphasizes the importance
of human choice and action. Kerner in particular argues for the uniqueness of human
personality. The fact that complex and diverse personalities (like Einstein’s) occur is
proof to him that God exists. For Kerner the very existence of such complex and fluid
personalities proves there is some meaning in the chaos. In Arcadia, Bernard makes a
similar argument when he angrily tells Valentine “you cannot put Byron in a laptop”
(Arcadia 60). Invention depends on chaos and unpredictability, and is ultimately shaded
by the complexities of the creator’s personality. Hannah also argues that this element of
unpredictability is necessary for genius. Valentine dismisses the fact that Thomasina and
Septimus could have discovered what their scribbling indicates “[b]ecause there’s an
order things can’t happen in. You can’t open a door till there’s a house.” Hannah
meaningfully responds, “I thought that’s what genius was” (Arcadia 79). Although
Thomasina’s brilliant equation depends on the computer in order to be fully realized, it is
still imbued by the complexities of her personality. Though the equation is logically
brilliant she gives it the witty (but silly) name: the “rabbit equation” because it “eats its
own progeny”. The complexities of human personalities and the actions they choose
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imbue the world with both chaos and order demonstrating the fundamental importance of
human action in the universe.
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CHAPTER IV: ORDER OUT OF DISORDER INTO DISORDER: THE
REGENERATIVE WALTZ

Nature has played a joke on the mathematicians. The nineteenth century mathematicians
may have been lacking in imagination, but Nature was not.
F.J. Dyson, ‘Characterizing Irregularity’29

Arcadia shares many characteristics with the previous plays discussed here. All
three contain mysteries which require detective style inquiry: in Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern the hapless duo try to determine why they are where they are and how they
should act; in Hapgood the titular character must determine how Ridley has been slipping
information to the Russians and whether or not Kerner has also become a double agent;
and in Arcadia Bernard seeks to discover what occurred when Byron was at Sidley Park
and Hannah searches for the Sidley Hermit. Superimposed on this modern timeline is the
timeline in question: 1809 - Thomasina Coverly has just begun to explore the mysteries
of her new mathematics.30 Stoppard uses both lines of inquiry (of the ability to accurately
reconstruct the past, and the move from Newtonian science to fractal geometry) to
display the fundamental connection between human action and the chaotic inclination of
the universe. By establishing a plot structure that employs recursive symmetry Stoppard
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(Nadel 433)

30

Thomasina’s mathematics seeks to describe the irregular forms of the universe, like an
apple leaf or a jagged coastline. Though she is limited by her lack of technology,
Valentine later proves that her early attempts were correct. Through fractal geometry,
Thomasina seeks to give order to the irregular patterns that appear in nature.
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creates a predetermined world which unfolds along with the undetermined actions of the
characters. Characters become agents of chaos and order in a world that becomes harder
and harder to predict with the more human interaction. Through strange attractors and
recursive symmetry Stoppard foregrounds the fundamental importance of human action
and choice in a universe which blends order and disorder and is constantly regenerating
itself. Stoppard structures his plot as a recursive system, constantly emphasizing the
power of sex, love and human action in a world that blends the determined and the
undetermined. What Stoppard achieves in Arcadia is not merely sentimentally powerful
or scientifically adroit – it is a melding of both modern science and universal humanism
which demonstrates that we are not merely affected by the chaotic inclinations of nature;
rather we are a fundamental part of it.
The structure of the play superimposes two timelines on the same scene. Although
the characters change as time shifts, the physical reality of the room does not. By using
recurrent images (or strange attractors) like the apple, the garden and the letters, Stoppard
demonstrates the level of determinism that is inevitable in the universe. Chaos occurs
when human actions (especially those driven by sex or love) disrupt the natural order.
Human desire becomes the external input in the complex system which no one can
predict with certainty.31 In Arcadia the characters become unpredictable autonomous
agents in the universe whose actions (no matter how trivial) have incalculable effects on
the universe. However, no matter how much chaos is created by human action, order is
31

Hayles differentiates that “[w]hereas Newtonian mechanics envisions the universe
through inertial reference frames that extend infinitely far in space and time, chaotic
concentrates on complex irregular forms and conceptualizes them (in fractal geometry)
through fractional dimensions that defeat tidy predictions and exact symmetries” (Hayles
7).
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inevitable. Thomasina finally gets a hint of justification for her intuition at the end of the
play in an article Septimus gives to her: “Well! Just as I said! Newton’s machine which
would knock our atoms from cradle to grave by the laws of motion is incomplete!
Determinism leaves the road at every corner, as I knew all along, and the cause is very
likely hidden in this gentleman’s observation” (Arcadia 83-84). Through his work
Stoppard has argued the humans are not mindless subjects battered around by the
universe rather they are a fundamental agents of chaos and order in the universe. Through
their free will to choose and act, human beings unleash energy into the universe which
gets mixed in with incalculable results. All one can do in such a universe is strive to find
truth where it is possible and to take responsibility for the potential chaos of one’s
actions.
Stoppard incorporates the conflict between Classicism and Romanticism,
mirroring the conflict between the ordered Newtonian physics and the disordered chaos
theory. The Romantic period signaled the end of the logical, ordered Classicism. The
narrow parameters on art, society and literature were removed and the response was an
effusion of beauty with an emphasis on “natural” and an avoidance of the artificial.32 The
garden is the physical manifestation of this conflict between Classicism and
Romanticism. Lady Coverly’s orderly garden is usurped by Mr. Noakes’s Romantic
landscape design. The garden comes to embody the principles of chaos theory: though it
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In “Keats and Romantic Science,” Alan Richardson explains: “With the mechanistic
scientific paradigm associated with Newton giving way to a biological emphasis typified
by Darwin, science and medicine took on a “Romantic” character, featuring a naturalistic
ethos, an attention to “organic form,” and developmental and ecological models that
show more than superficial resemblance to analogous impulses in the arts” (Richardson
231).
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is seemingly disordered, Mr. Noakes careful planning ensures that within the perceived
disorder of a garden, there is an underlying order.33 Through the common pursuit of
intellectual curiosity Stoppard bridges the gap between these two disparate periods.
Because Arcadia’s plot structure represents a system which displays recursive
symmetry there are a number of symmetries and asymmetries which occur throughout the
play. In each scene the general form (the set) is repeated. The stage directions specify the
uniformity of the set despite time period:
The action of the play shuttles back and forth between the early nineteenth
century and the present day, always in this same room. Both periods must share
the state of the room, without the additions and subtractions which would
normally be expected (Arcadia 15).
Although the objects remain in the fixed location of the room, the actions of the
characters are unpredictable and as a result the movement of the objects becomes
unpredictable. Septimus’s pet tortoise Plautus is almost indistinguishable from
Valentine’s Lightning. Fermat’s theorem (which Thomasina declares merely a joke to
drive everyone mad) is reflected at the end of the play by Thomasina’s own theorem
(which Septimus predicts will drive him mad). However, not all symmetries are sustained
across the two periods. The uncertainty of human behavior causes asymmetries which
cannot be predicted. Septimus and Thomasina share their first kiss in the hermitage;
Bernard and Chlöe are caught having sex in the hermitage by Chlöe’s mother who is
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Richardson argues: “The chemistry of the Romantic era – virtually a “new science”…
implied a constantly changing physical environment, a world of process and
transformation in contrast to the fixed and mechanical universe of Newtonian physics”
(238).
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looking for the theoldite (left by Hannah). Trivial acts bear incalculable effects in a
chaotic system. The more erratic the variable, the harder to predict its movements. Not
surprisingly, the fickle nature of sexual desire comes to have the biggest impact of all.
The apple, acting as a strange attractor, holds a dual meaning in the play; it is not
only a symbol of science and scientific progress (it is what inspires Thomasina and what
drives Hannah and Valentine to test her mad scribbling) but also becomes a symbol for
love and sexual desire. The apple, whose leaf becomes a central image in the play, is
introduced at the end of the first scene and is a point to which the play recurrently turns.
The apple, a timeless symbol of temptation from the Garden of Eden and the central
image in the apocryphal story of Newton’s discovery of gravity, is first given to Hannah
by a besotted Gus in the second scene. His gesture seems to confirm what Clöe has been
telling Hannah: Gus is in love with her. Disturbed by this display of affection, Hannah
places the apple on the desk. Septimus picks up the apple in the third scene and (after
cutting off the leaves and stems) proceeds to eat the apple, sharing occasionally with
Plautus. Moments later Thomasina picks up the discarded apple leaf and vows to deduce
its equation. Hannah will later pick up the same leaf as she timidly pushes Valentine, “So
you couldn’t make a picture of this leaf by iterating a whatsit?” (Arcadia 47). Although
Valentine denies such a possibility at first, by pushing Thomasina’s equation through a
computer a few million times, he discovers that she was in fact on the right track and
dubs the apple leaf algorithm: the Coverly set.
It is because of her general unease towards love and sexual desire that Hannah
originally abandons the apple on the desk. Indeed, in Arcadia the chaos sexual attraction
inspires is what drives the action of the play. Valentine refers to sex as “[t]he attraction
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that Newton left out” (Arcadia 74). As the characters act and make choices based on
sexual desire, new relationships are created and destroyed. The order and disorder created
by sexual desire unfolds together, creating the fabric of the human experience. The
effects of actions driven by sexual desire are unpredictable and their effects reverberate
from one time period to the next.
Sex is a constant source of disorder and conflict in the play, demonstrating the
unpredictability and potential chaos it is capable of creating34. Sex is introduced in the
first line of the play with Thomasina’s question, “Septimus, what is carnal embrace?”
(Arcadia 1). From that moment on, sex becomes one of the foreground issues in the play.
The establishment and dissolution of relationships drives the plot creating order and
chaos as sexual desire (the driving force) follows its own erratic course. The first scene
opens with the revelation of Septimus and Mrs. Chater’s tryst35 in the gazebo. The tryst
results in chaos with Chater’s discovery and threats of violence. Much of the first scene
consists of a confused conversation between Septimus, Chater, Mr. Noakes, Captain
Brice and Lady Croom. Lady Croom, Captain Brice and Mr. Noakes having unwittingly
walked in on Septimus and Chater’s confrontation begin discussing the garden. Septimus
and Chater consumed by their own predicament assume the other three are referring to
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As Vees-Gulani argues “sex is in fact responsible for many different (unexpected)
developments in the plot. It thus functions as a strange attractor to which the plot returns
again and again, resembling a self-similar fractal structure” (Vees-Gulani 417).
35

This affair sets up the conditions necessary to create the false history that Bernard
“discovers”. It is because of his affair with Mrs. Chater that Septimus is challenged to a
duel by Mr. Chater (in a note that Bernard later finds and assumes is Lord Byron’s) and is
forced to mollify Mr. Chater with false praise and the promise of a glowing review of
Couch of Eros. Sycophantically, Mr. Chater writes a warm inscription in Septimus’s copy
of Couch of Eros (which Bernard later misinterprets).
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Septimus’s tryst. The results are comical but nonetheless alarming to Septimus and
puzzling to Lady Croom. It is Thomasina who perceives the folly of both and restores
order: “Septimus, they are not speaking of carnal embrace, are you Mama?” (Arcadia
10).
The first scene sparks Thomasina’s sexual awakening which will continue
throughout the play and in turn creates more chaos which continues to drive the plot.
While constantly on the fringe, Thomasina is all the more observant giving voice to what
others do not or choose not to see. “Mama is in love with Lord Byron” Thomasina
offhandedly remarks (Arcadia 36). Although it is true that Lady Croom and Lord Byron
are having an affair, Thomasina does not state it just for the sake of conversation. She
does so (childishly) to needle Steptimus, who is obviously affected by the news,
“Septimus’s pen stops moving, he raises his eyes to her at last” (Arcadia 36). Thomasina
also reveals that Byron (in an attempt to impress Lady Croom) let slip that Septimus was
the author of a searing review of ‘The Maid of Turkey’ in front of Chater. This final
insult drives Charter (with Captain Brice’s encouragement36) to challenge Septimus to a
duel. In the midst of this confusion Lady Croom ducks in to “borrow” Septimus’s copy of
‘The Couch of Eros’ for her lover Byron.
Sex is a driving force, but it is not the defect of some omnipotent deity; rather, it
is the culmination of human action and choice both of which can have incalculable
affects on the universe. Septimus is saved from the duel when Lady Croom discovers
36

It is Captain Brice who has brought the Chaters to Sidley Park and it is suggested that
he has done so more for Mrs. Chater’s talents than for Mr. Chater’s. His encouragement
for Chater to engage in a duel with Septimus is really driven from his own jealousy at
having his mistress taken from him. Comically, Chater is the only one (except for
perhaps Thomasina) who does not realize this.
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Mrs. Chater leaving Lord Byron’s room in the middle of the night. Lady Croom
immediately dismisses the Chaters, Captain Brice (for bringing them there), and Lord
Byron. She is furious with Septimus for having invited Byron. He mollifies his mistress
by burning Byron’s letter, and scene six ends with the suggested promise of a late night
rendezvous between Septimus and Lady Croom. By the next scene however, there has
been a three year time lapse and Lady Croom has moved on, and is entertaining her new
lover Count Zelinsky in the next room. Septimus sulks as Thomasina (three years older
than in the last scene) vainly tries to flirt with her tutor. It is her desire for Septimus that
causes Thomasina to sneak down on the night before her birthday to steal a waltz and a
kiss. In Arcadia relationships are ruled by sexual desire which is unpredictable and
erratic. Lady Croom transfers blame, rationalizing: “[i]t is a defect of God’s humor that
he directs our hearts everywhere but to those who have a right to them” (Stoppard 71).
However, as the play demonstrates, this classical deterministic view is naïve to the reality
of the universe.
Thomasina asserts both the power of sex and the power of choice in her
discussion of Cleopatra. In her disdainful evaluation, Thomasina emphasizes not only the
sexual aspect of Cleopatra’s choices but the historical impact of these choices:
Everything is turned to love with her. New love, absent love, lost love – I
never knew a heroine that makes such noodles of our sex. It only needs a
Roman general to drop anchor outside the window and away goes the empire
like a christening mug into a pawn shop. If Queen Elizabeth had been a
Ptolmey history would have been quite different – we would be admiring the
pyramids of Rome and the great Sphinx of Verona (Arcadia 38).
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Thomasina argues that history would have been better off if the lusty Cleopatra had been
replaced by the “virgin” Queen. By juxtaposing two historically divergent sexual figures,
Thomasina identifies sex as an uncontrollable and unpredictable historical agent apt to
wreak chaos and destroy progress.
It is Chlöe who fully articulates the power of human action and sexual desire, and
their potential impact in the universe. The conversation between Chlöe and Valentine
about the possibility of a holistic prediction of future events reflects Thomasina and
Septimus’s earlier conversation. 37 The difference is that Chlöe rejects hope of any
definite knowledge of the universe reasoning that sex makes prediction impossible.
Chlöe: The future is all programmed like a computer – that’s a proper theory, isn’t
it?
Valentine: The deterministic universe, yes.
Chlöe: Because everything including us is just a lot of atoms bouncing off each
other like billiard balls.
Valentine: Yes. There was someone…38
Chlöe: But it doesn’t work, does it?
Valentine: No. It turns out the maths is different
Chlöe: No, it’s all because of sex.

37

Thomasina: “If you could stop every atom in its position and direction, and if your mind
could comprehend all the actions thus suspended, then if you were really, really good at
algebra you could write the formula for all the future; and although nobody can be so
clever as to do it, the formula must exist just as if one could.”
Septimus: “(Pause) Yes. (Pause.) Yes, as far as I know, you are the first person to have
thought of this” (Arcadia 5-6).
38

Valentine was most likely about to reference Pierre Simon de Laplace.
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Valentine: Really?
Chlöe: That’s what I think. The universe is deterministic all right, just like
Newton said, I mean it’s trying to be, but the only thing going wrong is
people fancying people who aren’t supposed to be in that part of the plan.
Valentine: Ah. The attraction that Newton left out. All the way back in the
garden. Yes. (Pause) Yes, I think you’re the first person to think of this
(Arcadia 74).
Chlöe sees the universe in the same determined way Newton did, however Chlöe
does not link human behavior to this same determined system. On the contrary, human
behavior becomes an agent of chaos in a determined world. Once again “the
unpredictable and predetermined unfold together to make everything the way it is”
(Arcadia 47). Human behavior is unpredictable and erratic and becomes increasingly
unpredictable when influenced by sexual desire. The importance of Chlöe’s argument lies
in the power and autonomy she gives to human action. People are not helplessly bound to
a determined system which drags them mercilessly to their death; rather they are free
agents capable of creating both order and disorder.
Even human affairs become recursive as the relationships of the modern period
reflect those of their nineteenth century counterparts. Like Lord Byron and Lady Croom,
Bernard and the current Lady Croom are engaged in a flirtatious, possibly intimate
relationship. Valentine tells Hannah:
My mother’s lent him her bicycle. Lending one’s bicycle is a form of safe sex,
possibly the safest there is. My mother is in a flutter about Bernard, and he’s no
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fool. He gave her a first edition Horace Walpole, and now she’s lent him her
bicycle (Arcadia 51).
Bernard’s potential affair is jeopardized by his current affair with her daughter Chlöe.
While Septimus seems to be conscientious of Thomasina’s feelings, Bernard is oblivious,
merely exhilarated by the game: “[n]o-I don’t want her mother to know. This is my first
experience of the landed aristocracy. I tell you, I’m boggle-eyed” (Arcadia 64). Like
Lady Croom, Bernard refuses to take responsibility for his actions, “[s]educed her? Every
time I turned round she was up a library ladder. In the end I gave in” (Arcadia 64).
Bernard is eventually burned when Chlöe’s mother catches her with Bernard in the
hermitage. This is not however Bernard’s most significant relationship in the play. The
relationship between Bernard and Hannah, though never physically sexual, is significant
because it pits the classical and romantic ideologies that shape the play against one
another.
As the dominant form of communication in the play and a strange attractor, letters
become a source of order and disorder as they both aid and sabotage the endeavors of
those trying to reconstruct the past. The opening action of the first scene mirrors that of
the third scene with Septimus, Thomasina and Jellaby on stage. The stage directions even
comment, “We have seen this composition before: Thomasina at her place at the table;
Septimus reading a letter which has just arrived; Jellaby waiting, having just delivered the
letter” (Arcadia 35). The opening action of both of these scenes hangs on the contents of
the letters. The letters of course are from the poet Ezra Chater, the first on the occasion of
Septimus’s adultery with Mrs. Chater and the second in outrage at the degrading review
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of Chater penned by Septimus. Septimus places both of these letters in his copy of The
Couch of Eros (Chater’s latest book) along with a warning letter from Mrs. Chater (that
her husband has sent for pistols). It is this copy of The Couch of Eros and its contents on
which Bernard, after discovering on the sales slip it had been in Byron’s library, bases his
investigation of Byron’s time at Sidley Park. On the basis of the letters, Bernard
extrapolates that Byron had an affair with Mrs. Chater and then killed the small time poet
Ezra Chater in a duel. Bernard believes this is the long searched for explanation as to why
Byron sailed to Lisbon and stayed abroad for two years after 1809. On the basis of the
passages underlined in The Couch of Eros, Bernard also infers that Byron was the
slanderous author of the Chater review in the Picadilly Recreation; he disregards the
inscription (written sycophantically to Septimus by Chater in hopes of a glowing review)
as merely indicative of the fact that the book did not originally belong to Byron.
Although Bernard’s conjecture is theoretically sound it cannot hope to accurately
reconstruct the complex motives and actions of human beings. When Hannah suggests
that Byron and Septimus may have been contemporaries at Trinity, Bernard is
encouraged to dig deeper. Hannah’s discovery of a letter from Lady Croom to her
husband discussing her brother, Captain Brice’s, marriage to Mrs. Chater in 1810 bolsters
Bernard’s theory. When Valentine reveals that Byron’s name is in the game books for
shooting a hare in 1809, Bernard takes this as confirmation of his theory and proceeds to
publish. As Hannah and Valentine attempt to point out to Bernard, speculating about a
person’s actions can be dangerous with no evidence to back it up. Exasperated, Hannah
exclaims “[l]ook, sorry – I only meant, Byron could have borrowed the book without
asking” (Arcadia 56). Ultimately, the only letter that would have been helpful to Bernard

80

is burned by Septimus before anyone has a chance to read it. Septimus is eager to prove
himself to his livid mistress because he is in love with her. His sexual attraction causes
him to destroy (by fire) the only shred of evidence that would have cast light on
Bernard’s case. The accusatory letters from Mr. Charter and the cautionary letter from
Mrs. Chater are what lead Bernard to make his false Byron hypothesis. Sex is so
powerful that even separated by a hundred and eighty years Septimus’s acts are still
causing confusion and chaos.
Through the garden and the characters’ relationships, Stoppard depicts the
aesthetic and intellectual movement from classicism to romanticism39 (from human
imposed order to embracing disorder) which mirrors the same movement made by
classical scientists with the discovery of quantum science. A recursive element in the
play, the garden becomes the perfect juxtaposition of the two ideologies that shape the
play: the rational order of the Enlightenment and the sentimentality of the Romantics.
The garden is largely discussed in 1809 by Lady Croom, who fretfully watches as Mr.
Noakes wreaks havoc on her perfectly ordered garden, and in 1989 by Hannah Jarvis,
who is investigating the Sidley Park hermit – her “peg for the nervous breakdown of the
Romantic Imagination” (Arcadia 25). Lady Croom woefully pours over Mr. Noakes
garden books, lamenting the loss of order:
Here is the Park as it appears to us now, and here as it might be when Mr. Noakes
has done with it. Where there is the familiar pastoral refinement of an
39

In a statement that strongly echoes the ethos of Hapgood, Demastes describes
Stoppard’s personal view of romanticism as “between the classical and absurdist
either/or, occupying a both/and landscape of interacting order and disorder eternally at
play” (Chaos 103).
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Englishman’s garden, here is an eruption of gloomy forest and towering crag, of
ruins where there was never a house, of water dashing against rocks where there
was neither spring nor a stone I could not throw the length of a cricket pitch. My
hyacinth dell is become a haunt for hobgoblins, my Chinese bridge…usurped by a
fallen obelisk overgrown with briars… But Sidley Park is already a picture and a
most amiable picture too. The slopes are green and gentle. The trees are
companionably grouped at intervals that show them to advantage. The rill is a
serpentine ribbon unwound from the lake peaceably contained by meadows on
which the right amount of sheep are tastefully arranged – in short, it is nature as
God intended (Arcadia 12).
Lady Croom detests the “eruption of gloomy forest” and the fact that her Chinese bridge
has been “usurped by a fallen obelisk overgrown with briars”. However, Lady Croom’s
lamentation juxtaposes (humorously) the folly in both styles. On the one hand, Lady
Croom believes “nature as God intended” must be ordered by humans, carefully
constructed with “the right amount of sheep… tastefully arranged”. On the other hand,
the Romantic design represents ordered disorder (like chaos theory). Though parts of the
design may seem silly (“ruins where there was never a house”) what is important is the
emphasis on orderly chaos. It is for this reason Thomasina declares Mr. Noakes the
“Emperor of Irregularity”. He masterfully combines the undetermined and the
predetermined until the two come together to form the Romantic landscape.
Hannah, like Lady Croom, values the order of Classicism and after studying Mr.
Noakes’s garden books has pegged the Sidley Hermit as the perfect symbol of “the whole

82

Romantic sham” (Arcadia 27). She disdainfully refers to Noakes’s design as “untamed
nature in the style of Salvator Rosa. It’s the Gothic novel expressed in landscape.
Everything but vampires” (Arcadia 25). Echoing Lady Croom, Hannah wistfully
describes Sidley Park before Mr. Noakes’s alterations as “smooth, undulating, serpentine
– open water, clumps of trees, classical boathouse” (Arcadia 25). Like Lady Croom,
Hannah values order and logic and disdains the chaotic “Romantic sham”. Her work “The
Genius of the Place: Landscape and Literature 1750 to 1834” posits the hermit of Sidley
Park as the symbol of:
[a] century of intellectual rigour turned in on itself. A mind in chaos suspected of
genius. In a setting of cheap thrill and false emotion. The history of the garden
says it all, beautifully. There’s an engraving of Sidley Park in 1730 that makes
you want to weep. Paradise in the age of reason. By 1760 everything had gone…
ploughed under by Capability Brown. The grass went from the doorstep to the
horizon and the best box hedge in Derbyshire was dug up for the ha-ha so the
fools could pretend they were living in God’s countryside. And then Richard
Noakes came in to bring God up to date. By the time he’d finished it looked like
this… The decline from thinking to feeling, you see. (Arcadia 27).
Hannah’s nostalgia for the Enlightenment is barely surpassed by her disdain for
Romanticism. She flatly tells Bernard, “I don’t like sentimentality” (Arcadia 28). Hannah

83

rejects sentimentality for reason, thinking for feeling and logic for intuition. 40Despite
Hannah’s adherence to logic, her theory isn’t any more correct than Bernard’s.
Stoppard emphasizes Hannah’s role as the classically sensible “Newtonian” by
introducing Bernard Nightingale, her ideological opposite, shortly after. Bernard “wears a
suit and tie. His tendency is to dress flamboyantly, but he has damped it down for the
occasion, slightly. A peacock-coloured display handkerchief boils over his breast pocket.
He carries a capacious leather bag which serves as a briefcase” (Arcadia 16). By
juxtaposing the two character descriptions, Stoppard is immediately pitting the thinker
and the feeler against one another. One scene that demonstrates the disparity between the
classical and romantic temperaments occurs during the fourth scene between Hannah and
Bernard. Having presumably just discovered a superscription by Byron in Couch of Eros,
Bernard is challenged by Hannah:
Hannah: Is it his handwriting?
Bernard: Oh, come on.
Hannah: Obviously not.
Bernard: Christ, what do you want?
Hannah: Proof
Bernard: Proof? Proof? You’d have to be there, you silly bitch! (Arcadia 49)
Bernard’s Byron theory gains even greater steam when Hannah presents him with
evidence confirming that Mrs. Chater remarried (insinuating that Mr. Chater had indeed
40

William Demastes argues “Hannah uses her mind to try to prove that Sidley Park is
paradigmatic of the 19th century ‘decline from thinking to feeling, intimating a desire to
use orderly thought to prove it superior to the chaos/picturesque/Romantic model, which
she describes as the irregularity of sentiment” (Chaos 99).
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been killed). Bernard pounces upon this shred of evidence and embraces it as definitive
proof that his theory is true. Hannah however, true to the classical form, remains
skeptical. “You haven’t established it was fought. You haven’t established it was Byron.
For God’s sake, Bernard, you haven’t established Byron was even here!” (Arcadia 50).
Although Bernard’s theory is wrong, his response to Hannah’s challenge encapsulates
one of the central conflicts of the play: between rational thinking and intuitive feeling,
Bernard: I’ll tell you your problem. Not guts.
Hannah: Really?
Bernard: By which I mean a visceral belief in yourself. Gut instinct. The part
of you which doesn’t reason. The certainty for which there is no backreference. Because time is reversed. Tock, tick goes the universe and then
recovers itself, but it was enough, you were in there and you bloody know.
(Arcadia 50)
Although Bernard may be as wrong about time being able to flow backwards as he is
about Byron, his assertion about Hannah is accurate.
The relationship between Bernard and Hannah is not only an iteration of the
earlier intellectual seekers (Septimus and Thomasina) it also juxtaposes classical and
romantic ideologies.41 Hannah seeks to expose the Romantic sham and Bernard seeks to
expose the dark motive for Byron’s (Bernard’s hero and the face of Romanticism) trip to
Lisbon. The difference between the two is introduced in their character descriptions.

41

Zeifman references Stoppard who has said he wanted “to write about the contrast
between the classical temperament (“those who have particular respect for logic,
geometry and pattern”) and the romantic temperament (“those with a much more
spontaneous, unstructured communion with nature”) (qtd. in Zeifman 186).
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Pragmatic Hannah is introduced wearing “nothing frivolous. Her shoes are suitable for
the garden” (Arcadia 15). If Hannah represents the classical mindset, Bernard positively
champions Romanticism. Flamboyant, sensual and impulsive, Bernard constantly offends
Hannah’s (and Valentine’s) sensibilities. He publishes impulsively, ignoring anything
that might contradict his theory. He sensationalizes his story, titling it: ‘Even in Arcadia –
Sex, Literature and Death at Sidley Park’. He passive -aggressively takes a swipe at
Valentine (and his work with grouse populations) when he declares “but as we know
now, the drama of life and death at Sidley Park was not about pigeons but about sex and
literature” (Arcadia 56). Hannah is constantly exasperated by Bernard as he refuses to
conform to her logical system and persistently insists on using his intuition.
In the end gut instinct and cold rationality both fail as Bernard and Hannah
discover their theories are wrong. Bernard’s theory is undermined by the fact that
Septimus burns the only letter (the one from Byron that Septimus burns for Lady Croom)
that would have shed light on the truth. Hannah’s original theory about who was the
hermit of Sidley Park is wrong and though she discovers (or intuits) that it was Septimus,
she has no way of proving it. By way of a magazine article she discovers that the
thousands of pages of cabalistic proofs found in the hermitage were not mad scribbling
but a continuation of Thomasina’s mathematical intuitions. Hannah cannot prove this
however because the contents of the hermitage were burned dismissed as the scribblings
of a “mind in chaos.” Despite Bernard and Hannah’s faith in their intuition and logic
(respectively) their efforts to accurately reconstruct the past are thwarted by sex and love
and the actions they motivate.
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Neither logic nor intuition stands a chance when faced with the unpredictabilities
of human action and choice – especially when it comes to love and sex. Bernard’s
intuition cannot recover the complex and unpredictable sexual motivations of character’s
in the past. By focusing on one sexual liaison (Byron and Mrs. Chater) Bernard ignores
the numerous other possible liaisons, which in the end significantly affect his theory.
Hannah presumes the hermit is a fixture; placed there as a part of the ludicrous Romantic
aesthetic, like the ruins and the obelisk. That love is a factor never dawns on Hannah.
Septimus becomes the hermit and toils to extend Thomasina’s algorithm because he is
tortured by her death. He is not mad as everyone (including Hannah at first) accuses him
of being; he is heartbroken. The realization is humbling to Hannah as she discovers that
even she is not immune to the transformative forces of chaos or love, and as the play
progresses she slowly learns to rely less on her own intellect and more on her feelings.
By the end of the play Hannah (who has repeatedly stated her opposition to romance,
sentimentality and relationships in general42) lets her guard down and allows Gus to take
her in his arms and lead her in a waltz as the piano faintly plays from the next room.
The iterative and recursive nature of the plot and action reflects the selforganizing and regenerative qualities of chaotic systems and demonstrates how sensitive
such systems are to unknown variables. In Arcadia, the characters become the unknown
variables and it is through their actions that the plot is able to regenerate itself. Stoppard
infuses his play with aspects of modern science in such a way that foregrounds the

42

“What the hell is it with you people? Chaps sometimes wanted to marry me, and I
don’t know a worse bargain. Available sex against not being allowed to fart in bed”
(Arcadia 63).
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importance and significance of human action. Their actions have the ability to create
chaos or to unearth order from the disorder around them. By demonstrating the potential
power of human action, Stoppard makes his argument that humans are not merely
affected by the chaotic inclinations of nature; rather they are a fundamental part of it.
The argument between Valentine and Bernard crystallizes the opposition between
Classicism and Romanticism and brings the question of triviality into play. As the
rational Hannah and Valentine try to make Bernard see the holes in his theory, Bernard
and Valentine clash over the issue of triviality:
Bernard: (Jeering) Parameters! You can’t stick Byron’s head in your lap top!
Genius isn’t like your average grouse.
Valentine: (Casually) Well, it’s all trivial anyway.
Bernard: What is?
Valentine: Who wrote what when…
Bernard: Trivial?
Valentine: Personalities.
Bernard: I’m sorry – did you say trivial?
Valentine: It’s a technical term.
Bernard: Not where I come from, it isn’t (Arcadia 60).
Valentine defends his position arguing that it doesn’t matter who got there first – what
matters is the knowledge acquired. Bernard explodes: “But don’t confuse progress with
perfectibility. A great poet is always timely. A great philosopher is an urgent need.
There’s no rush for Isaac Newton. We were quite happy with Aristotle’s cosmos.
Personally, I preferred it” (Arcadia 61). Valentine values the cold rationality of science,
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indifferent to the complexities of personality and sturdily factual in its testability. Bernard
values the individuality of artistic expression, utterly absorbed in the complexity of
personality, incapable of being computer generated.43
It is Valentine, the modern day chaotician who is able to create order out of
Thomasina’s discovery. Generations later, what were considered mad scribblings are now
part of a new science that is revolutionizing the accepted world view and the role of
people in it. Through Valentine, Stoppard explains not only the complexities of chaos
theory but the importance of Thomasina’s discovery and why she was never able to get it
to “square back to sense”:
Hannah: What I don’t understand is… why nobody did this feedback thing before
– it’s not like relativity, you don’t have to be Einstein.
Valentine: You couldn’t see to look before. The electronic calculator was what
the telescope was for Galileo.
Hannah: Calculator?
Valentine: There wasn’t enough time before. There weren’t enough pencils! (He
flourishes Thomasina’s lesson book.) This took her I don’t know how
many days and she hasn’t scratched the paintwork. Now she’d only have
to press a button, the same button over and over. Iteration. A few minutes.
And what I’ve done in a couple of months, with only a pencil the
calculations would take me the rest of my life to do again – thousands of
pages – tens of thousands! And so boring (Arcadia 51).

43

Thomasina’s “genius” on the other hand depends on the computer in order to reach full
realization.
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Thomasina is limited; there is not enough room or time to extend her “rabbit equation”. It
is through her equation that Thomasina intuits that order can arise out of disorder.
Intellectual curiosity bridges the gap between the two time periods; despite
differences in ideology and practice, the intellectual seekers in Arcadia all have the same
goal: to create order out of their disordered universe. Hannah assumes a modern (and
quantum) position that values the trivial and it’s potential. Hannah identifies the desire
and the active search to discover truth to be the most significant facet of our experience.
Hannah articulates the importance of the trivial, intellectual curiousity and the human
experience:
It’s all trivial – your grouse, my hermit, Bernard’s Byron. Comparing what we’re
looking for misses the point. It’s wanting to know that makes us matter.
Otherwise we’re going out the way we came in… (Arcadia 76).
The most thrilling aspect of this universal search is that, as Uncertainty Principle
suggests, we will never completely understand mysteries of our universe, but as long as
intellectual seekers exist order will inevitably arise and the meaning will never be lost. As
the plot demonstrates the trivial becomes increasingly important in a complex system.
Although the relationships and situations are recursive, human actions (no matter how
trivial) create asymmetries which defy prediction.
When Thomasina first articulates her intuition about entropy (“You cannot stir
things apart”) it is Septimus who makes the connection between the implications of
entropy, free will and the role of human action in the universe:
No more you can, time must needs run backward, and since it will not, we must
stir our way onward mixing as we go, disorder out of disorder into disorder until
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pink is complete, unchanging and unchangeable, and we are done with it forever.
This is known as free will or self-determinism (Arcadia 5).
Septimus intuits that the Newtonian paradigm is inimical to free will: “If everything from
the furthest planet to the smallest atom of our brain acts according to Newton’s law of
motion, what becomes of free will?” (Arcadia 5). Septimus sees the inherent
incongruencies between Newtonian determinism and free will. The Newtonian paradigm
does not work because it does not factor in the reality of free will. Quantum science on
the other hand embraces unpredictability and therefore it embraces free will and all of the
potential chaos it may wreak.
Valentine also expresses the incongruencies between reality and the Newtonian
paradigm however he has 180 years of science to justify them:
When your Thomasina was doing maths it had been the same maths for a couple
of thousand years. Classical. And for a century after Thomasina. Then maths left
the real world behind, just like modern art, really. Nature was classical, maths was
suddenly Picassos. But now nature is having the last laugh. The freaky stuff is
turning out to be the mathematics of the natural world (Arcadia 45).
This “freaky stuff” which defied Newton consistently proved to be a more accurate
representation of reality. But while the new science could describe the very big and the
very small, the everyday remains inaccessible:
The ordinary-sized stuff which is our lives, the things people write poetry about –
clouds – daffodils – waterfalls – and what happens in a cup of coffee when the
cream goes in – these things are full of mystery, as mysterious to us as the
heavens were to the Greeks (Arcadia 48).
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The occurrences of the everyday, including human actions, remain as inexplicable and
unpredictable as the cosmos were to the Greeks. As Thomasina intuits, chaos theory
finally offers an explanation of the most mysteriously banal elements of everyday life.
Septimus absent mindedly replies to Thomasina’s insistence that traditional mathematics
is ill-equipped to depict the realities of the world around them: “He [God] has a mastery
of equations which lead into infinities where we cannot follow” (Arcadia 37). Thomasina
refuses to accept that the world works in a way that is understandable to God but
inaccessible to her, “What a faint-heart! We must work outward from the middle of the
maze” (Arcadia 37). Thomasina is not satisfied to merely cow to the divine determinism
of classical mathematics. She realizes that as part of the system the best she can do is try
to understand it from the inside out.
As the timelines converge, the implications of Thomasina’s ‘rabbit equation’
become clear.44 Although the inevitable implications of the second law of
thermodynamics still apply, Thomasina’s discovery promises a possibility of renewal
after destruction. Though the world may suffer heat death it will regenerate itself through
its destruction:
Thomasina: No marks?! Did you not like my rabbit equation?
Septimus: I saw no resemblance to a rabbit.
Thomasina: It eats its own progeny.
(Septimus and Hannah turn the pages doubled by time.)
Hannah: Do you mean the world is saved after all?
44

As Nadel argues, “[t]he grand mystery Stoppard is able to present in mundane terms is
the fate of the universe, made marvelously clear at one point through the overlapping
conversations of Septimus, Thomasina, Hannah and Valentine” (Nadel 442).
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Valentine: No, it’s still doomed. But if this is how it started, perhaps it’s how the
next one will come.
Hannah: From good English algebra?
Septimus: It will go to infinity or zero, or nonsense.
Thomasina: No, if you set apart the minus they square back to sense (Arcadia
77-78).
Through her ‘rabbit equation’ Thomasina intuits how order can arise out of disorder.
What has been lost will be recovered.
Septimus makes a similar observation about the inevitable recovery of knowledge
earlier in the play while discussing the burning of the Library at Alexandria with
Thomasina. Though Thomasina mourns the intellectual loss, Septimus reassures her that
all will be restored:
We shed as we pick up, like travellers who must carry everything in their arms,
and what we let fall will be picked up by those behind. The procession is very
long and life is very short. We die on the march. But there is nothing outside the
march so nothing can be lost to it. The missing plays of Sophocles will turn up
piece by piece, or be written again in another language. Ancient cures for diseases
will reveal themselves once more. Mathematical discoveries glimpsed and lost to
view will have their time again (Arcadia 38).
Septimus’ observation is made ever more poignant by Thomasina’s death by fire at the
end of the play. Although Thomasina tragically loses her life, her ideas and her work are
not lost with it. Through Septimus’s dedication to her vision, Valentine and Hannah are
able to recover what has been lost: the brilliant mind of Thomasina Coverly.
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In the final scene, the timelines converge once more; this superposition of
timelines becomes even further complicated by the fact that the characters in the modern
period have put on Regency dress for a party. For the first time not only is the set
indistinguishable from one time period to the next but the characters become harder to
place. It is possible to identify them with their period due to which characters interact
with which and our previous experience however it is arguably harder to separate the
two. The audience is faced with the future superimposed on the past. This
superimposition is compounded by the fact that the characters in the past and in the
present are all discussing Thomasina’s discovery:
(Septimus and Valentine study the diagram doubled by time.)
Valentine: It’s heat.
Hannah: Are you tight, Val?
Valentine: It’s a diagram of heat exchange.
Septimus: So, we are all doomed!
Thomasina: (Cheerfully) Yes.
Valentine: Like a steam engine, you see – (Hannah fills Septimus’s glass from the
same decanter, and sips from it.) She didn’t have the maths, not remotely.
She saw what things meant, way ahead, like seeing a picture (Arcadia 93).
Thomasina articulates her vision despite the fact that she doesn’t have any mathematical
expressions to affirm what she intuits about heat and ultimately the universe:
Hannah: What did she see?
Valentine: That you can’t run the film backwards. Heat was the first thing which
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didn’t work that way. Not like Newton. A film of a pendulum, or a ball
falling through the air – backwards, it looks the same.
Hannah: The ball would be going the wrong way.
Valentine: You’d have to know that. But with heat – friction – a ball
breaking a window Hannah: Yes.
Valentine: It won’t work backwards.
Hannah: Who thought it did?
Valentine: She saw why. You can put back the bits of glass but you can’t collect
up the heat of the smash. It’s gone.
Septimus: So the Improved Newtonian Universe must cease and grow cold. Dear
me (Arcadia 93).
What Thomasina realized was that in the universe (like in her porridge) “the heat goes
into the mix” (Arcadia 94). Valentine articulates the cosmic significance: “(He gestures
to indicate the air in the room, in the universe) And everything is mixing the same way,
all the time, irreversibly” (Arcadia 94). Perhaps one of the most powerful moments in the
play, the two timelines hang in a suspended superimposition of states as the characters in
both realize the implications of Thomasina’s discovery. This scene is imbued with a
heightened level of urgency as the audience realizes they are seeing Thomasina on the
eve of her seventeenth birthday and her death. The papers Septimus is poring over will in
fact drive him to become the mad hermit after Thomasina’s untimely demise. His
subsequent scribbling will eventually lead Hannah and Valentine to re-discover
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Thomasina’s work. Although Thomasina’s brilliance is lost with her in the fire, her
thoughts live on through Septimus and are regenerated in the present.
It is Thomasina who gives hope to the audience and the characters in the face of
her (and the universe’s) impending doom:
Septimus: When we have found all the mysteries and lost all the meaning, we will
be alone on an empty shore.
Thomasina: Then we will dance (Arcadia 94).
Thomasina realizes that although death (of the self or universe) is inevitable so is
regeneration. Death does not have to be the end. Even as the universe continues to slowly
cool, it is out of this process that the next will come. Nothing is ever truly lost. What else
is one to do but dance? The image of the two dancing couples, waltzing in unison across
time remains an image of hope for the audience. 45 Although Thomasina will surely go to
her death once the dance is done, her work and her love will not be lost. Septimus, out of
love, toils to extend Thomasina’s algorithm. It is his work which brings Hannah to Sidley
Park, where she meets Gus who innocently falls in love. Through her work with
Valentine and Bernard, Hannah discovers her Romantic side and letting go of her staunch
un-sentimentality opens herself to Gus’s love. Disorder regenerates into order; love that
is lost in 1812 is restored in 1989. Though order inevitably becomes disorder, the quest
for knowledge is not futile. Intellectual curiosity is the driving force of order in an
otherwise chaotic world. These seekers of order and truth give meaning to an otherwise
senseless universe. Like strange attractors their repeated attempts at finding order create
45

Nadel posits that “the dance is the triumphant, visual celebration of Thomasina’s early
observation that things cannot be stirred apart, set against the inescapable backdrop of the
dissipation of energy” (Nadel 433).
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an overarching pattern that gives us meaning and purpose. There is always the hope of
coming order, even in the face of crippling disorder.
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CONCLUSION

Color my life with the chaos of trouble. Cause anything’s better than posh isolation.
Belle and Sebastian46

In Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Hapgood, and Arcadia, Tom Stoppard is not
merely juxtaposing quantum science and human interactions for the sake of drama; rather
by excavating the complexities of human action, choice and identity through the lens of
chaos theory and quantum science, Stoppard demonstrates the fundamental connection
between individuals and the post-Newtonian world. Although Heisenberg’s Uncertainty
Principle dispels any hope of complete knowledge of our universe, chaos theory at least
gives us the hope of influence. As Guil desperately proclaims: we have influence.
Though we cannot know anything with complete certainty we do know that we have the
opportunity to act. and with that action potentially change the world and the people
around us. Stoppard puts the universe back in the hands of his characters who, like
everyone, struggle with questions of certainty and prediction. By creating dramatic
situations which parallel or are infused with the principles of quantum science, Stoppard
demonstrates the power of their, and by association our, actions in the universe. Guil
condemns himself, and Ros, when he chooses not to act after discovering Hamlet’s death
sentence. Blair, crippled by his ‘either/or’ mentality, forces Hapgood to act (by leaving)
after he puts her son in harm’s way. Sexual desire drives Arcadia’s plot as the effects of
characters’ actions and choices reverberate across almost two centuries. As Stoppard
46

(Belle and Sebastian xvii/xviii)
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demonstrates, humans create just as much chaos through their actions as they are subject
to by nature. Chaos theory demonstrates the importance of trivialities, including human
actions and choice, suggesting that whether or not there is an omnipotent being keeping
watch, human actions have very real and unpredictable consequences in our universe.
Chaos theory throws off the shackles of scientific and spiritual determinism. Humans are
not victims of the chaotic universe; rather they are a fundamental part of it. Their actions
create a ripple effect which reverberates throughout the universe with incalculable and
unpredictable effects.
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